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ABSTRACT
When market intermediaries unlawfully acquire market power,
vertically related market participants may sue under the antitrust laws to
recover damages. Their ability to recover depends upon an intricate set
of doctrines that define private standing, including the indirect-purchaser
rules set down by the Supreme Court most notably in Illinois Brick. In
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court decided the application of the indirectpurchaser rules to a particular kind of intermediary, a platform in a twosided market. The article explores private antitrust standing doctrines as
they apply to market intermediaries, using Apple to frame the exposition.
The Court there held that iPhone owners are not barred by Illinois Brick
from recovering damages from Apple for monopolizing the distribution
of iPhone apps. The article argues that the Court may have reached the
right result, but not for the right reason. The dissent and Apple reached
† A. Robert Noll Distinguished Professor of Law, Penn State Law, the Pennsylvania
State University, University Park. I am especially grateful to Roger Blair for hours of
discussion exploring the issues addressed in this article and for his comments on an earlier
draft. All errors are mine.
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the wrong result, or at least did not offer the right reason. Apple imposed
an ad valorem charge for using its platform in a two-sided transaction
market, and in these circumstances, whether iPhone users had a right to
sue for damages depends on whether the marginal costs of distribution
were positive, a condition that was not addressed.
INTRODUCTION
Private parties may obtain damages for antitrust violations, but this
right is cabined by an intricate and overlapping set of doctrines. Section
4 of the Clayton Act provides that “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained . . . .”1 The statute on its face imposes several analytically
distinct conditions on antitrust damage recoveries. The plaintiff must be
a “person.” The person must suffer an injury in fact, or a loss. That injury
must be to the person’s “business or property.” The injury must be caused
by an antitrust violation, for it must be sustained “by reason of” the
violation. Finally, the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled must
correspond to his or her injury.2 Damages are an estimate of the
cognizable loss suffered by the plaintiff, and before trebling, they are a
measure of compensation. They approximate the difference between the
plaintiff’s actual economic condition and the condition the plaintiff
would have occupied but for the violation.
The courts have added to this list of manifest conditions two
requirements. First, the plaintiff’s injury must be “antitrust injury,” which
is an injury of the kind the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. The
antitrust laws were designed to protect the social benefits of competition. 3
1. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2021).
2. The implication of the statute is that the violation must be causally connected to the
amount of damages recovered. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 125 (1969) (referring to “the necessary causal relation between” an antitrust violation
and the claimed damages) (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S.
690, 696–01 (1962)); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555,
563 (1931) (quoting Taylor v. Bradley, 4 Abb. Ct. App. 363, 367 (N.Y. 1868)) (recognizing
that an antitrust plaintiff may recover a reasonable approximation of the “damages resulting
necessarily and immediately and directly from the breach” of the legal mandate); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. So. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927) (recognizing that damages
are an estimate of “the probable loss” caused by an antitrust violation).
3. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927) (“[T]he public
interest is best protected from the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of
competition.”) (citing United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897));
Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (“The
fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act was to . . . protect the public against evils commonly
incident to destruction of competition . . . .”); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,
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Section 4, therefore, recognizes the right to be compensated for injuries
that result from an illegal restraint on competition. Thus, to qualify for
compensation, an injury must be “of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’
acts unlawful.”4 Antitrust injuries are those losses a restraint on
competition are “likely to cause.”5 Second, a private plaintiff must have
antitrust standing.6 Broadly understood, the antitrust standing doctrine
eliminates from the universe of compensable injuries those harms that are
somehow remote from the antitrust violation.7 The claims would satisfy
all other explicit and implicit requirements for compensation, including
notably the antitrust injury requirement, but are nevertheless excluded.
Consequently, some persons suffering antitrust injuries because of an

58 (1911) (“[T]he dread of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs . . . led . . . to the
prohibition or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreasonably restrictive of
competitive conditions . . . .”); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress
designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’”) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978)).
4. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
5. Id. (quoting Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 125).
6. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
535 (1983) (holding that not all persons who satisfy the requirements of § 4 of the Clayton
Act are entitled to recover damages). Some courts treat antitrust injury as a component of
antitrust standing. See 11 JOSEPH P. BAUER, KINTNER FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 78.1 n.14
(Supp. 2019). For clarity, we prefer treating the requirements as separate. However
characterized, antitrust injury is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a private
plaintiff’s right to sue for antitrust violations. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) (“A showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always
sufficient, to establish standing under § 4 . . .”); Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886
F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that “antitrust injury is ‘a necessary but insufficient
condition’ for antitrust standing”) (quoting Barton & Pittinos v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,
118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997)).
7. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 (2014)
(quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992)) (observing that the
proximate cause requirement, which applies to the Clayton Act, “generally bars suits for
alleged harm that is ‘too remote’ from the defendant’s unlawful conduct”); Balaklaw v.
Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 798 n.9 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921
F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991)) (noting that factors other than antitrust injury affecting a
private antitrust plaintiff’s right to sue for damages relate largely “to the directness and
identifiability of the plaintiff’s injury” and determine whether the plaintiff is “an efficient
enforcer of the antitrust laws”); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443
(2d Cir. 2005) (endorsing Balaklaw). The causation requirement that is explicit in § 4 could
be understood as corresponding roughly to the concept of factual cause in tort law, and the
directness requirement that is part of antitrust standing might then correspond to what tort law
traditionally has treated as proximate cause. But an alternative interpretation of the statutory
requirement is that it embraces both factual and proximate cause. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at
126 (emphasizing that § 4 imposes a proximate cause requirement). As so understood,
antitrust standing doctrine does not impose any causation requirement separate from the
requirement contained in § 4.
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antitrust violation are not entitled to recover damages for want of antitrust
standing.
The most important application of the antitrust standing doctrine is
the indirect purchaser, or Illinois Brick,8 rule. In a simple case, when a
firm or firms violate the antitrust laws and charge a supra-competitive
price for a product, the immediate purchaser pays an overcharge, and
subsequent purchasers also pay an overcharge, for some of the initial
overcharge is passed down to buyers throughout the distribution chain.
Illinois Brick denies standing to all but the immediate, or direct,
purchasers from the antitrust violators even though subsequent
purchasers incur an antitrust injury. 9 Significantly, the Illinois Brick rule
is not limited to product or service purchasers. Illinois Brick involved a
conspiracy among sellers, but the rationale of Illinois Brick applies as
well when the antitrust violator is a buyer or group of buyers.10 When one
or more buyers exercise monopsony power, they will reduce the price
paid for a good.11 Immediate suppliers to antitrust violators who pay them
sub-competitive prices have antitrust standing under Illinois Brick, but
remote suppliers—those who supply suppliers—do not.
Antitrust standing doctrine has a host of applications beyond Illinois
Brick.12 Of particular relevance here, when a firm or group of firms
exercise monopoly power and raise prices, the quantity of output they sell
declines.13 As a result, the quantity of input they purchase declines, and
input suppliers may lose profits on the units not sold to them, depending
on whether and the extent to which the suppliers can sell these units to
buyers outside the affected market. If the output seller or sellers

8. See 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Zinser v. Cont’l Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 760 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 941 (1982); (“In Illinois Brick, an indirect purchaser could not recover for an
overcharge which had been passed on to him. It logically follows that an indirect seller, i.e.,
one who did not deal with the defendant, may not recover for an undercharge set in motion
by the indirect buyer’s unlawful activities.”); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148,
1159 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that “there is nothing special about monopsony or
oligopsony price-fixing cases that justifies treating them differently from monopoly pricefixing cases for passing-on purposes”); Doe v. Ariz. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass’n, No. CV 071292-PHX-SRB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42871, at *25 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2009) (citing
Zinser, 660 F.2d at 760) (recognizing that Illinois Brick applies to buyers’ cartels).
11. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
78 (2010).
12. See BAUER, supra note 6, § 78.7.
13. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 92 (4th ed. 2005). This assertion assumes that the firm or firms charge a single
price, rather than price discriminate by charging multiple prices. Price discrimination may or
may not result in an output reduction. See id. at 299–05.
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exercising monopoly power have no monopsony power, they would by
definition have no power to affect input price by reducing the quantity of
input purchased, though they would purchase fewer units; if they have
monopsony power, they will reduce the quantity purchased and pay a
lower price.14 Any losses incurred by suppliers can be characterized as
antitrust injuries, and the suppliers satisfy all other necessary conditions
for recovering damages. But they do not have antitrust standing, even if
they sell directly to the antitrust violators.15 This conclusion does not
conflict with the proposition stated above, that sellers to an antitrust
violator have standing. In that case, suppliers sell to purchasers exercising
monopsony power; in the case described here, suppliers sell to purchasers
exercising monopoly power.16
A private antitrust plaintiff that establishes a right to recover must
provide some evidence of the amount of its damages. To be recoverable,
damages cannot be speculative.17 Antitrust damages in general are
calculated to place the plaintiff in the economic position it would have
occupied but for the violation; the amount is then trebled pursuant to
Clayton Act § 4.18 Normally, if the antitrust violation raises the price paid
by a direct purchaser, the purchaser may recover in single damages the
difference between the amount it paid and the lower amount it would have
paid absent the violation, or the overcharge, multiplied by the quantity it
purchased from the violator.19 If the violation instead lowers the amount
14. Partial equilibrium analysis of the output market does not consider the effects in other
markets resulting from a reduction in the employment of inputs. When input markets are
perfectly competitive, inputs not used in one output market are used in other output markets.
In these circumstances, the only loss if any incurred by input suppliers is the marginal
transaction cost in selling to different purchasers. Output sellers in the market affected by the
exercise of monopoly power would buy less input but not at a lower price. See HEINZ KOHLER,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 465 (3d ed. 1990).
15. See, e.g., Contreras v. Grower Shipper Vegetable Ass’n, 484 F.2d 1346, 1347 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that agricultural workers lacked standing to assert claim for damages caused
by a conspiracy among producers to raise lettuce prices).
16. See id.
17. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (“[E]ven where
the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more precise computation, the jury may not
render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork.”); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931) (noting “damages may not be determined by
mere speculation or guess”); BAUER, supra note 6, § 79.1, at 97 (“The conclusion that the
extent or amount of the plaintiff’s harm was speculative . . . is perhaps the most frequent basis
for refusing to allow (or upsetting on appeal) an award of damages.”).
18. See BAUER supra note 6, § 79.1(b)(1), at 91–92; see also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2021).
19. See BAUER, supra note 6, § 79.1(b)(2), at 104 (“Since a principal effect of violations
such as monopolization and price fixing is the elevation of the price paid by the buyer, the
most common form of relief in those cases is recovery of the unlawful ‘overcharge.’”)
(collecting cases). We need not consider here the issue of “umbrella” standing, or the right of
a purchaser to recover from an antitrust violator overcharges paid to a non-violator who raises
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a seller received from a violator, the seller may recover the difference
between the amount it received and the higher amount it would have
received absent the violation, or the underpayment, multiplied by the
quantity it sold to the violator.20
The examples above are simple ones. When commercial
transactions become complex, the application of private standing
requirements becomes less certain, even confounding.21 For instance,
what happens when a firm unlawfully acquires and exercises both
monopoly and monopsony power? Who can sue, and for what harm?
Does it matter whether the offender buys input and sells output in separate
markets or facilitates interactions between suppliers and customers in a
single market? Does the method by which the antitrust violator charges
input suppliers for its services and output purchasers for its products
matter? Complicated transactions pose challenging issues of causation,
antitrust injury, antitrust standing, and damages.22
One context in which the rules of private antitrust standing blur is
that of platforms. A platform is a kind of intermediary. It brings together
different groups of actors who want to interact with each other. In Apple
Inc. v. Pepper,23 iPhone users alleged that Apple monopolized the retail
market for the sale of iPhone applications (“apps”) and as a result

its prices because of the supra-competitive pricing of its competitors. See U.S. Gypsum Co.
v. Ind. Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2003) (Easterbrook, J.) (citing Loeb
Industries, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of America, 306 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2002) (allowing claim);
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1171 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing
claim); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 587 (3d Cir. 1979)
(denying claim); BAUER, supra note 6, § 78.8 nn. 352–53 and accompanying text.
20. See United Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 575 (10th Cir. 1961)
(recognizing that sellers to a buyers’ cartel were entitled to recover damages based on the
difference between “the price they were paid” for their product “and the prices they would
have received but for the antitrust violations”). Again, we may put aside umbrella standing.
See supra note 19; cf. Allen v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 323, 352 (D. Vt.
2010) (allowing sellers to recover under-payments to buyers not participating in conspiracy
who were cowed into paying lower prices by cartel).
21. See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 881 F.3d 262, 268 (3d Cir. 2018)
(citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 536
(1983)) (“The term ‘standing’ as used in the antitrust context is conceptually difficult and has
not been delineated with precision.”).
22. When the prerequisites of a private cause of action are described in this way,
“causation” refers to the statutory requirement of factual cause contained in § 4 of the Clayton
Act, and some conception of proximate cause is contained in the requirement of “antitrust
standing.” See supra pp. 2086–87 (discussing factual vs. proximate causation). Alternatively,
one could interpret the statutory requirement as embracing both factual and proximate
causation, in which case proximate cause is no longer part of antitrust standing analysis. See
infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
23. 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1518 (2019).
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overcharged for them.24 Many iPhone apps are produced by third-party
app developers.25 Apps perform functions that iPhone users value by
meshing technologically with the phone’s operating system. Apple,
therefore, through its smartphone operating system, iOS, facilitates a
connection between app developers and iPhone users.26 An app is useless
unless it interacts with the operating system, and a phone is not smart
without functioning apps.27 Apple, through technological and contractual
restrictions, prevents iPhone app developers and iPhone users from
transacting except through the App Store. 28 The app developer sets the
price of the app sold in the App Store and paid by the iPhone user to
Apple, and Apple conveys the payment to the developer less thirty
percent of the price, which it retains as a commission.29 The app
developers purchase app distribution as well as operating system services
from Apple, and iPhone users purchase services and apps from Apple.30
The Court, 5–4, held that iPhone users have standing to sue Apple
for monopolization as direct purchasers from Apple within the meaning
of Illinois Brick.31 It rejected Apple’s argument that, because developers
set the prices that Apple charges iPhone users, only developers are direct
purchasers.32 In the rejected conception, Apple functions as the agent of
the app developer in the sale of the app to the iPhone user; it is the direct
purchaser of distribution services from Apple; and only the second
transaction is relevant for standing purposes.33 The dissenting justices
would have confined standing to app developers primarily on grounds of
proximate cause: Any monopolization of app distribution proximately
causes developers but not iPhone owners injury. 34
Because a platform in economic analysis connects at least two
different kinds of users, it operates in a two-sided (or multi-sided)

24. See id.
25. See id. at 1519 (noting that Apple does not itself create most of the approximately two
million apps available to iPhone owners for download from the App Store).
26. See iOS 14, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-14/ (last visited May 13, 2021).
27. See
Smart-Phone,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE(R)
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/smartphone (last visited May. 13, 2021)
(defining “smartphone” as “a cell phone that includes additional software functions (as e-mail
or an internet browser)”).
28. See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1518–19.
31. See id. at 1520.
32. See id. at 1520, 1521–22.
33. See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521–22.
34. See id. at 1526, 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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market.35 It sells platform services to members of both groups. Each
group obtains value from interacting with the other group, 36 and
therefore, within certain limits, the members of each group benefit as the
size of the other group increases. 37 This kind of economy of scale in
consumption is the essence of indirect network effects. Positive indirect
network effects challenge antitrust analysis, in applying both substantive
and procedural rules to platforms. Because platforms must consider the
effects of pricing and other decisions not only on the side of the market
to which they immediately apply but also the effects on the other side of
the market brought about by the effects on the first side, an antitrust
analysis of either side alone is misleading. 38
The analyses and arguments in Apple fail to take account of the
nature of the transactions or acknowledge the nature of the market. In its
main argument, Apple proposed the wrong legal principle, one based on
agency, and it reached a dubious conclusion, that iPhone users have no
standing.39 The Court failed to appreciate the implications of Apple’s
payment model, but it correctly rejected Apple’s proposed principle.
Given the procedural posture of the case, it reached the right conclusion
or at least the conclusion that would have been proper had the plaintiffs
more carefully pleaded their claim, that iPhone users do have standing to
sue Apple.40 The dissent incorrectly focused on a single concept—
35. The terminology is not uniform. Authors often refer to “two-sided platforms”; if the
definition of a platform is that it connects two groups of customers, the term “two-sided
platform” is redundant. The term “platform” is sometimes used to denote a service provided
to any group of customers. We generally use the term “platform” to denote a service or set of
services provided to at least two groups of customers.
36. See, e.g., Julian Wright, One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets, 3 REV. NETWORK
ECON. 44, 44 (2004) (“Two-sided markets involve two distinct types of users, each of whom
obtains value from interacting with users of the opposite type over a common platform.”).
37. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2281 (2018) (“[T]he value of the
services that a two-sided platform provides increases as the number of participants on both
sides of the platform increases.”). Value may decline if negative congestion externalities
overtake positive participation externalities. See, e.g., DAVID EASLEY & JON KLEINBERG,
NETWORKS, CROWDS, AND MARKETS: REASONING ABOUT A HIGHLY CONNECTED WORLD 534–
35 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
38. See Ohio, 138 S. Ct. at 2287 (holding that a payment card company operates in a twosided transaction market and its conduct must be evaluated by examining both sides of the
market); see also SC Innovations, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 18-cv-07440-JCS, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77397, at *26–27 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (concluding that competitor
sufficiently alleged adverse effects on both sides of ride-sharing platform to avoid dismissal).
39. See Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521–22.
40. Professor Hovenkamp also concludes that the Court reached the right conclusion in
Apple, at least within the context of the existing Illinois Brick rule, but for reasons different
from those set out in this Article. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing
Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser Rule, 120 COLUM. L. REV. FOR. 14, 27 (2020). Professors
Kobayashi and Wright set out an analysis similar to that used in this article but focus on the
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proximate cause—and misapplied that concept to reach the wrong
conclusion.41 The correct result for the correct reasons eluded both
factions of the Court and the defendant.
The upshot is that the analysis of antitrust standing in Apple and
other cases involving intermediaries is exceptionally difficult, requiring
a careful assessment of market realities, transaction characteristics, legal
doctrines, and the justifications for the Illinois Brick rule. This article
identifies the private parties that have a right to recover damages when
an intermediary unlawfully acquires monopoly power alone or both
monopoly and monopsony power in one-sided markets and when an
intermediary acquires monopoly power in a two-sided market. It explains
that in a two-sided market, private antitrust standing, in the broad
meaning of the term, depends initially on whether the intermediary
charges parties a fee for a transaction between them. Standing then
depends on the form of the charge, and depending on the form, the
existence of significantly positive marginal costs of production and
distribution.
In the next Part, the article sets out principles of private antitrust
standing. Part II describes in more detail the decision in Apple and
another platform case. Part III presents an economic analysis of platforms
and the challenges they pose for antitrust. Part IV explains the economic
effects of an intermediary’s exercise of market power, using Apple to
frame the exposition. It contrasts a case in which a firm functions as an
input buyer and output seller in two single-sided markets and one in
which a firm functions as a transaction platform in a single two-sided
market. A transaction platform might charge either a per-unit or an ad
valorem fee for its services in facilitating a transaction between two other
parties.42 It explains that when a transaction platform charges a per-unit
fee, both sellers of the relevant good and buyers are injured and have
standing to recover damages caused by the platform’s monopolizing
conduct. When the platform imposes an ad valorem fee, both sellers and
buyers are injured and have antitrust standing, but only when the marginal
costs of production and distribution are significantly positive. Part V
applies the law of private standing and the economics of intermediary

task the district court confronts on remand. See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright,
What’s Next in Apple Inc. v. Pepper? The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and the Economics of
Pass-Through, 18 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 249, 252 (2019).
41. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1530–31.
42. An ad valorem charge is one “imposed at a rate percent of value.” Ad Valorem,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE(R)
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ad%20valorem (last visited May. 13, 2021).
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market power to Apple, and by extension, to platform cases generally.
Part VI critiques the arguments of the Apple dissent and Apple itself.
I. THE LAW OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST STANDING & DAMAGES
A. Conditions & Limitations
The antitrust laws both create and limit a private right of action to
recover damages for antitrust violations.43 Clayton Act § 4 authorizes a
“person” to recover “threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 44 To have this right, the
person must be “injured in his business or property.”45 The concept of
injury, or injury in fact, is reasonably clear: The person must be made
worse off, or suffer a loss.46 That condition implies a baseline, and the
relevant baseline is the person’s state before the antitrust violation takes
place. Injury is inherently a relational concept.

43. The focus here is on federal antitrust law. Most states permit private antitrust actions
for damages under their own statutes, and state antitrust laws and their interpretations often
track federal law. See STATE ANTITRUST LAW § 7.03 (2017) (noting that, “[a]s in federal cases,
state antitrust statutes often require treble damages to be awarded to successful plaintiffs”).
However, many states reject the indirect purchaser rule. See id. § 8.02[2] (noting that “at least
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have declined to follow Illinois Brick.”). State
laws that conflict with federal law in this regard are not preempted. See California v. ARC
America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 99–00 (1989). The analysis in this article does not resolve the
private standing issue in a state that permits indirect purchasers to recover damages.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2021). The term “person” is broadly defined by statute to include
business entities. See id. §§ 7, 12(a) (defining “person” as used in the antitrust laws “to include
corporations and associations”). The term includes natural persons despite the explicit
statutory reference to “corporations and associations.” See United States v. Wise, 370 U.S.
405, 408 (1962) (rejecting argument that the statute implicitly excludes corporate officers
from definition of “person” by explicitly referring to corporations). The term includes
sovereign states (see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942)), municipalities (see
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906)), and foreign
governments (see Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov’t of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318 (1978)).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).
46. The limitation of the judicial power of federal courts contained in Article III of the
constitution to the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies” imposes on plaintiffs its own
requirement of injury in fact, or “an invasion of a legally protected interest.” Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984)). That injury in fact, whether suffered or threatened, must be “concrete and
particularized.” Id.; Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125
(2014) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The injury-in-fact requirement of antitrust standing
“mirrors the Article III constitutional standing requirement.” Nat’l ATM Council, Inc. v. Visa
Inc., 922 F. Supp. 2d 73, 80 (D.D.C. 2013).
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The phrase “business or property” is broadly defined.47 It includes
most tangible assets other than bodily integrity. 48 In particular, “property”
includes money, and both a commercial entity and a human being suffer
an injury to property when the juridical person loses money, whether that
loss represents a reduction in profits, which only a business can
experience, or some other loss of wealth. 49
Further, the antitrust violation must cause the loss, for the person
must suffer the injury “by reason of” something “forbidden in the
antitrust laws.”50 This statutory requirement of causation embraces at
least the tort concept of actual causation. For tortious conduct to be an
actual, or factual, cause of harm, it must generally be a necessary or
sufficient condition of the harm. The philosophical concept of a necessary
condition is embodied in the familiar legal principle of “but for”
causation: The injury would not have been sustained but for the
defendant’s conduct.51 The defendant’s conduct is also an actual cause if
it alone would have resulted in the injury even though other conduct took
place that would have caused the same loss.52 It is then a sufficient
condition along with other sufficient conditions.53 Losses that would have
been sustained regardless of an antitrust violation, therefore, are not
compensable under the Clayton Act.
Tort law traditionally has recognized an additional concept of
proximate causation, which functions as a legal limitation on those actual
47. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (“[T]he word ‘property’ has
a naturally broad and inclusive meaning. In its dictionary definitions and in common usage
‘property’ comprehends anything of material value owned or possessed.”).
48. See id. at 339 (citing Hamman v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 420, 432 (Mont. 1967))
(noting that the statutory phrase “business or property” excludes “personal injuries suffered”).
Emotional distress also unquestionably fails to qualify as “business or property.” See id.
49. See id.
50. 15 U.S.C. §15(a).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (Am. L. Inst. 2010) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS] (“Conduct is a factual
cause of harm when the harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”). The Restatement
recognizes that harm may have multiple factual causes, such that the harm would not have
occurred absent any one of them. See id. cmt. c (“An actor’s tortious conduct need only be a
factual cause of the other’s harm. The existence of other causes of the harm does not affect
whether specified tortious conduct was a necessary condition for the harm to occur.”); see
also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (recognizing that events often
“have multiple but-for causes” such that the non-occurrence of any would avoid the outcome).
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, supra note 51, § 27 (“If multiple acts occur, each
of which under § 26 alone would have been a factual cause of the physical harm at the same
time in the absence of the other act(s), each act is regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”).
53. See Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (explaining that
a “sufficient condition is something that, if it is present, something else is bound to happen”
and relating philosophical concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions to tort law).
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causes for which liability can be imposed.54 The Third (and latest)
Restatement of Torts eschews the language of proximate causation in
favor of zone of liability.55 Specifically, “[a]n actor’s liability is limited
to those harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct
tortious.”56 Notably, the Restatement Third does not quarrel with the idea
that liability can be imposed for only a subset of factual causes,57 but it
argues that the term “proximate cause” is a poor descriptor of the relevant
limitation.58 Tort law has always embraced the concept that certain losses
may be so improbable that imposing liability on a wrongdoer for them
would subvert the law’s purposes.59 In many circumstances, the more
remote a harm is from wrongful conduct, the less probable it is, but the
critical variable is probability. Liability for an injury is thus limited to a
subset of factual causes, those for which the probability of the injury
times its magnitude justifies taking greater precaution.60
Antitrust law, for its part, has always recognized the principle that
an antitrust violator’s liability is limited to a subset of private parties
actually injured by the violation, and courts, including the Supreme
54. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
(BASIC PRINCIPALS) (2003) ch. 6, Special Note on Proximate Cause (Am. L. Inst. 2003)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT BASIC PRINCIPALS] (observing that “the term ‘proximate cause’
has been in widespread use in judicial opinions, treatises, casebooks, and scholarship”). Prior
Restatements used the term “legal cause” to denote both factual cause and proximate cause.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
55. See RESTATEMENT BASIC PRINCIPALS, supra note 54, at ch. 6, Special Note on
Proximate Cause (noting that “proximate cause” is not generally used in the chapter because
the term “is an especially poor one to describe the idea to which it is connected”).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, supra note 51, § 29.
57. See id. § 29 cmt. a (“No serious question exists that some limit on the scope of liability
for tortious conduct that causes harm is required.”).
58. See RESTATEMENT BASIC PRINCIPALS, supra note 54, at ch. 6, Special Note on
Proximate Cause; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, supra note 51, § 29 cmt. b. In particular,
“the term ‘proximate cause’ implies that there is but one cause—the cause nearest in time or
geography to the plaintiff’s harm—. . . [but] multiple proximate causes are often present.” Id.
§ 29 cmt. b.
59. For example, in BCS Servs., Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 637 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir.
2011) (Posner, J.), the court observes that proximate cause cuts off liability where
too many unexpected things had to happen between the defendant’s wrongdoing and
the plaintiff’s injury, in order for the injury to occur—so many unexpected things that
the defendant couldn’t have foreseen the effect of his wrongdoing and therefore
couldn’t have been influenced, in deciding how much care to employ in the activity
that produced the wrongful act, by the prospect of inflicting such an injury as
occurred. And then holding him liable would have little effect in deterring wrongful
conduct.
(citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 108, 118 (1963)) (citations omitted).
60. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand,
J.) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL.”).
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Court, have described this principle as the requirement of proximate
cause.61 Injuries that are in a meaningful sense remote from the violation
are not compensable. This principle, which the Court has found implicit
in the statutory causation requirement, 62 is often formally recognized in
the broader requirement of antitrust standing, which is considered
below.63
In addition to the requirements set out above, the plaintiff’s injury
must be of a kind the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. It must be
an antitrust injury.64 The Court first articulated the antitrust injury
requirement in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.65 That case
involved a claim by the owner of bowling centers that the acquisition of
several financially distressed competing centers by Brunswick, one of the
two largest manufacturers of bowling equipment, violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act.66 Had Brunswick not rescued the centers, they would have
exited the market, and the plaintiff, then faced with less competition,

61. See, e.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126
(2014) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,
532–33 (1983)) (noting that the Court had held that § 4 of the Clayton Act limits recovery “to
plaintiffs whose injuries were proximately caused by a defendant’s antitrust violations”);
Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (noting that the Court had “held
that a plaintiff’s right to sue under § 4 required a showing that the defendant’s violation not
only was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well”); Supreme Auto
Transp., LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc., 902 F.3d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Proximate
causation is an essential element that plaintiffs must prove in order to succeed on [their
antitrust and tort claims].”); Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 412
(2d Cir. 2014) (citing Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476–77 & n.13 (1982))
(explaining that antitrust courts in determining a plaintiff’s right to sue consider the directness
and indirectness of the asserted injury “using familiar principles of proximate causation”);
Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. All., 123 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1988)) (noting
that an antitrust plaintiff must prove an injury to it “proximately caused by the defendants’
conduct”).
62. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 532–
33).
63. See infra notes 80–100 and accompanying text.
64. The terminology used to describe the private right to bring an antitrust action is
maddeningly inconsistent. One court identified “four requirements for antitrust injury: (1)
unlawful conduct, (2) causing an injury to the plaintiff, (3) that flows from that which makes
the conduct unlawful, and (4) that is of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”
Am. Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). Under this
formulation, causation and injury in fact are components of antitrust injury rather than
independent requirements. See id. However organized, these elements are necessary to the
private right of action.
65. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
66. Id. at 479–81; 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2021) (prohibiting acquisitions of stock or assets that
may “substantially lessen competition[] or tend to create a monopoly.”).
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would have earned higher profits. 67 Moreover, the vertical acquisitions
might have lowered Brunswick’s costs, confronting the plaintiff with a
more efficient competitor.68 The plaintiff sought to recover its lost profits
caused by the allegedly unlawful acquisitions. 69 Just why acquisitions
that preserve competition and perhaps increase efficiency would ever
violate § 7 is opaque.70 But Brunswick in the Supreme Court did not
challenge the appellate court’s determination that a jury could find a
violation; the Court merely observed that “[i]f the acquisitions here were
unlawful, it is because they brought a ‘deep pocket’ parent into a market
of ‘pygmies.’”71 Rather, the Court held that, for a different reason, the
plaintiff could not recover for its claimed losses: To recover damages on
account of § 7 violations,
[p]laintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss
that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”72

A loss sustained as a result of maintaining competition was not the
kind of loss that a violation of § 7 was likely to cause.73 The Court later
explained that antitrust injuries are losses that “stem from an
anticompetitive aspect of the defendant’s conduct,” and it confirmed that
the antitrust injury requirement applies to all antitrust violations, not
merely Clayton Act § 7 violations.74
In short, the antitrust injury doctrine means that the plaintiff must be
“hurt . . . in the way that the framers of the antitrust laws had in mind.” 75
67. See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 479–81.
68. See id. at 483.
69. See id. at 480–81.
70. For a discussion of the Court’s failure to address substantive merger law in Brunswick
and possible reasons for resolving the case on antitrust injury grounds, see John E. Lopatka
& William H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust Law, 17
ANTITRUST 20, 21, 24–25 (2002).
71. Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 487.
72. Id. at 489 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125
(1969)) (second alteration in original).
73. See id. at 490.
74. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340–41 (1990).
75. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 709 (7th Cir. 1984);
see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 932 (7th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that firms forced to lower prices in response to their competitors’ efficient merger
suffer actual injury but not antitrust injury because their injury “is not the sort of injury that
antitrust law is concerned with preventing or remedying”). Judge Posner observed that the
antitrust injury doctrine is merely the application to antitrust of the tort doctrine of negligence
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The framers intended to prohibit conduct that restrains competition,
understood as a process that maximizes economic welfare. 76 A
competitive restraint that reduces allocative efficiency violates the
antitrust laws, and in many cases an antitrust injury is a kind of loss that
varies in proportion to the size of the inefficiency. 77 The key concept,
however, is that an injury is of a kind that a restraint on competition is
likely to cause, even if it produces no inefficiency. Antitrust injury and
antitrust standing can be understood as doctrines that result in damage
liability that approximates the optimal antitrust penalty, which equals the
net harm suffered by persons other than the offender.78 As we shall see,
some actors can suffer antitrust injury by a platform’s exercise of illgotten monopoly power even when it produces no static welfare loss.79
The Supreme Court has recognized that not every person who has
suffered an antitrust injury caused by an antitrust violation is entitled to
bring an antitrust claim. The doctrine of antitrust standing limits the scope
of those entitled to sue to a subset of victims.80 In Associated General
Contractors v. California Council of Carpenters, the Court identified a
number of factors as relevant in determining whether a plaintiff has
per se, illustrated by Gorris v. Scott, 9 L. R. Exch. 125 (Eng. 1874) (rejecting claim that ship
owner’s failure to comply with statute intended to prevent spread of contagious disease among
animals by requiring that they be confined in pens onboard ships established negligence when
compliance would have prevented sheep from being washed overboard during storm); see
Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 708–09. As the Supreme Court stated in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., the tort rule epitomized by Gorris is “that a plaintiff may not
recover under the law of negligence for injuries caused by violation of a statute unless the
statute ‘is interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its
violation.’” 572 U.S. 118, 130 n.5 (2014) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN D. DOBBS, ROBERT
E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 229–30 (5th
ed. 1984)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, supra note 51, § 14 (stating version of the
negligence per se doctrine). In Lexmark, the Court referred to this principle as the “zone-ofinterests test” and emphasized that “it applies to all statutorily created causes of action” a
universe that includes antitrust actions. 572 U.S. at 129 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 163 (1997)). One could say, then, that the antitrust-injury requirement of private standing
under the antitrust laws is synonymous with the zone-of-interests test. See id.
76. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to
“competition . . . as a process for maximizing consumer welfare”), vacated on other grounds,
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
77. See William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1445, 1459–61 (1985).
78. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
652, 656 (1983).
79. See infra notes 98–99, 106 and accompanying text.
80. As one court observed, “[I]f a manufacturer is the target of anticompetitive conduct,
not every firm linked to him by the forces of demand and supply is entitled to sue for damages
caused, indirectly, by that conduct.” Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473
(7th Cir. 1982) (citing In re Indus. Gas Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519–20 (7th Cir. 1982)).
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antitrust standing.81 The list is confusing, in part because it includes as
mere considerations conditions that are independent requirements, such
as antitrust injury and causation,82 and in part because some of the factors
are redundant. Indeed, even the factors themselves are not crisply
presented but must be teased out of the Court’s opinion. The Third
Circuit, for example, derived five relevant considerations from
Associated General:
(1) The nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury: Is the injury “of a
type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for
violations of the antitrust laws”?
(2) The directness or indirectness of the asserted injury.
(3) The proximity or remoteness of the party to the alleged injurious
conduct.
(4) The speculativeness of the damages claim.
(5) The risk of duplicative damages or complexity in apportioning
damages.83
Without disputing the accuracy of the Third Circuit’s reading of
Associated General, the Supreme Court in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc.,84 disparaged the list, as adapted for
actions brought under the Lanham Act. 85 The Court noted, for instance,
that the first factor, requiring that the plaintiff’s injury be in the zone of
interests protected by the relevant statute, and the second and third
factors, which redundantly require proximate cause, are not mere factors
to be weighed but are instead “requirements, which must be met in every
case.”86 Thus, an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
address is an antitrust injury, which is a necessary condition for a private
81. 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983).
82. See, e.g., Phila. Taxi Ass’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., 886 F.3d 332, 343 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quoting Barton & Pittinos, Inc., v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting that “antitrust injury is ‘a necessary but insufficient condition’” for antitrust
standing)); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540–46) (observing that a showing of antitrust
injury is necessary but not sufficient to establish standing).
83. Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir.
1998) (citations omitted) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538, 540, 542, 543–
44).
84. See 572 U.S. 118, 134–36 (2014).
85. See id. at 135. For example, when the Associated General factors were used to
determine Lanham Act standing, the first factor was modified to ask whether the injury was
a type that Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of the
Lanham Act rather than of the antitrust laws. See id. The federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (2021), prohibits inter alia false associations in the sale of goods or services and false
advertising. See Lexmark Int’l Inc., 572 U.S. at 122.
86. Id. at 135.
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antitrust cause of action, and proximate cause is the appropriate meaning
of the statutory causation requirement.87 The fourth and fifth factors are
problematic because potential difficulty in apportioning damages is not,
as the Third Circuit’s summary of Associated General might suggest, an
independent basis for denying standing where the plaintiff’s injury is
within the zone of interests protected by the statute. 88 A plaintiff might
be entitled to equitable relief, and difficulty in apportioning damages
could not justify denying standing.
In all, the Court instructed that a plaintiff has a right to sue under a
federal statute when he or she has constitutional standing and is within
the class of plaintiffs authorized to sue. 89 Statutory authorization, in turn,
depends upon statutory interpretation, and statutes are interpreted in light
of two background principles:90 a statutory cause of action extends only
to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone of interests protected by
the law;91 and a statutory cause of action is presumptively limited to
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the
statute.92
Despite the confusion in the meaning of Associated General, the
Court’s objective in that case is clear: To limit the right to sue for antitrust
violations in ways that promote the appropriate private enforcement of
the law. As some courts have put it, the right to sue is confined to
“efficient enforcers.”93 But even this conception of the enforcement
87. Recall that one could alternatively limit statutory causation to factual causation and
require proximate causation through a separate doctrine of antitrust standing. See supra notes
6–7 and accompanying text. Reading the statutory requirement to include proximate cause
means that the statute on its face requires both actual and proximate cause, for under
traditional tort analysis, only an actual cause can be a proximate cause.
88. Lexmark Int’l Inc., 572 U.S. at 135.
89. See id. at 128.
90. Id. at 129.
91. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)).
92. Id. at 132. Limiting a statutory right of recovery to those suffering injury proximately
caused by a violation is equivalent to excluding from the right those suffering remote injuries
as a result of the violation. Judge Posner has referred to “the age-old tort principle of
remoteness of damage,” which he explains “serves practical goals of preventing duplicate
recovery of damages and proliferation of lawsuits.” Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc.,
694 F.2d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1982). “[T]he tort principle of remoteness [has been] absorbed by
implication into section 4 [of the Clayton Act].” Id. at 474.
93. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Henry Bath LLC, 936 F.3d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2019)
(quoting Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007))
(“To satisfy the antitrust standing requirement, a private antitrust plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) it has suffered ‘a special kind of antitrust injury,’ and (2) it is an ‘efficient enforcer’
of the antitrust laws.”); Gatt Commc’ns, Inc. v. PMC Assocs., LLC, 711 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir.
2013) (noting that antitrust standing analysis is intended to determine whether plaintiff “is an
‘efficient enforcer’ of the antitrust laws”). In Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759,
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objective is not self-defining.94 Antitrust standing might be understood as
a doctrinal method of ensuring that private damages approximate the
optimal penalty for an antitrust violation. 95 The optimal sanction for an
antitrust violation is the net social harm caused by the offense, adjusted
by the probability of imposition. 96 Certain antitrust injuries are not part
of the optimal penalty. Allowing recovery for those injuries would
necessarily result in an excessive penalty.

772 (2d Cir. 2016), the Second Circuit explained that private plaintiffs must suffer antitrust
injury and be “efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws.” Further, it stated:
The efficient enforcer inquiry turns on: (1) whether the violation was a direct or
remote cause of the injury; (2) whether there is an identifiable class of other persons
whose self-interest would normally lead them to sue for the violation; (3) whether the
injury was speculative; and (4) whether there is a risk that other plaintiffs would be
entitled to recover duplicative damages or that damages would be difficult to
apportion among possible victims of the antitrust injury. Built into the analysis is an
assessment of the “chain of causation” between the violation and the injury.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Port Dock & Stone Corp., 507 F.3d at 121–22). Another,
substantively similar formulation is that the antitrust standing requirement ensures that “other
parties are not better situated to bring suit.” Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med.
Alliance, 123 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1988)).
94. Some courts have implicitly sought to identify efficient enforcers by limiting the right
to recover to participants in the market in which the defendants acted anticompetitively; some
of these courts impose the limitation under the rubric of antitrust injury, but it fits more
comfortably under that of antitrust standing. See, e.g., In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust
Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417,
423 (5th Cir. 2001)) (“Generally, only those that are participants in the defendants’ market
can be said to have suffered antitrust injury.”); id. (noting that plaintiff must “be a participant
in the same market as the alleged malefactors”); American Ad Mgmt., Inc. v. General Tel.
Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Antitrust injury requires the plaintiff to have
suffered its injury in the market where competition is being restrained.”). But the Supreme
Court has recognized an exception to this principle for non-participants who suffer an injury
“inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict.” Blue Shield of
Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 484 (1982); see also Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig.,
833 F.3d at 158 (noting that because of the inextricably intertwined exception, “[t]he universe
of potential plaintiffs is not strictly limited to participants in the defendants’ market”);
Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1983) (“[A]
finding or concession that [plaintiff] is not a direct participant in the relevant market is not
dispositive of the § 4 ‘standing’ issue [because] McCready instructs that an injury
‘inextricably intertwined’ with the injury sought to be inflicted upon the relevant market or
participants therein may fall ‘within the area of congressional concern’ so as to satisfy the §
4 inquiry.”). The frequency with which the “inextricably intertwined” exception is litigated
has robbed the rule of much of its value. See BAUER, supra note 6, § 78.6 nn.102–03
(collecting cases).
95. Doctrines that result in private recoveries equal to the optimal penalty can lead to overdeterrence when public sanctions are also imposed. Neither private nor public antitrust
penalties formally take into account the possibility that the other set of sanctions will render
the first set excessive.
96. Landes, supra note 78, at 656–57.
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However the antitrust standing doctrine is characterized, a critical
implication is that input suppliers selling to an actor with lawful
monopsony power or to actors who compete in a market for the purchase
of the input but exercise ill-gotten monopoly power in an output market
do not have antitrust standing to recover for any injuries sustained from
a reduction in the amount of input the antitrust offenders buy from them
as a result of the exercise of monopoly power. 97 If the actors exercising
monopoly power do not possess or at least do not exercise monopsony
power, the input suppliers will sell less to them but at the same
competitive input price. The suppliers would not absorb an
underpayment, though they might incur an antitrust injury in the form of
avoidable transaction costs incident to selling the input in other markets.
If the actors exercise monopoly power, have monopsony power, and do
not price discriminate, the suppliers will sell less to them at a price below
that received prior to the exercise of monopoly power even if the actors
do not exercise their monopsony power. Whether the actors have or do
not have monopsony power, the suppliers do not have antitrust standing
to complain about an unlawful exercise of monopoly power. In
corresponding fashion, if actors exercise monopsony power but not
monopoly power, suppliers have antitrust standing, but output purchasers
do not, even if they suffer an injury.
The damages a private plaintiff may recover for an antitrust violation
are intended to be compensatory, with adjustments made to account for
various factors, the most important of which is the probability of
recovery.98 As a first approximation, damages are calculated to place the
victim of an antitrust violation in the position it would have occupied but
for the unlawful conduct.99 The calculation, therefore, compares two
97. See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 990 (N.D. III.
2003) (Posner, J.) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597–99 (7th Cir. 1995))
(observing in a case where customers allegedly conspired to raise the price of a product that
“[t]he general rule is that suppliers do not have ‘standing’ (a word that is used in this context
to denote the right to sue rather than the existence of jurisdiction) to complain about a violation
of the antitrust laws at the customer level.”); see also Internal Med. Nephrology, Inc. v. BioMedical Applications of Ind., Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00506, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165228, at
*16–17 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2019) (holding that nephrology service provider did not have
antitrust standing to assert claim that kidney dialysis provider had monopolized dialysis
market).
98. See Landes, supra note 78, at 656–57.
99. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 263–64 (1946)
(approving measure of damages based on difference between profits actually realized and
“what, but for the conspiracy, would have been realized”); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler
Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981) (recognizing that damages are based on “what
plaintiff’s situation would have been in the absence of the defendant’s antitrust violation”);
BAUER, supra note 6, § 79.1(b)(1) (“Damages for the victim of an antitrust violation should
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states of the world, one of which is theoretical. Courts have long
recognized that proving what the plaintiff’s condition would have been
but for the violation is difficult.100 Further, rejecting an antitrust claim for
insufficient evidence of the quantum of loss incurred creates a risk of both
under-compensation and under-deterrence, the latter of which itself
threatens to increase the social harm caused by antitrust violations. Courts
have concluded that any uncertainty should benefit the victim rather than
the wrongdoer.101 They have, therefore, distinguished between proof of
causal injury and proof of the amount of damages. A plaintiff must prove
with a fair degree of certainty that the defendants’ antitrust violation
caused it some harm.102 The burden of proving the dollar amount of that
harm, however, is relaxed, though a loose constraint remains: The
plaintiff’s evidence of damages cannot be speculative.103
attempt to place it in the same position as it would have been, absent the unlawful conduct.
This analysis requires the trier of fact to determine the plaintiff’s putative financial situation,
‘but for’ the violation.”).
100. See, e.g., J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 565 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc. 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)) (“‘[Damage] issues in these cases are rarely
susceptible of the kind of concrete, detailed proof of injury which is available in other
contexts.’”); Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 573 n.31 (1990) (quoting J. Truett
Payne, 451 U.S. at 565–66, with approval).
101. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927) (citing
Hetzel v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 169 U.S. 26, 39 (1898)) (noting that that “a defendant
whose wrongful conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages
suffered by the plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the
same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible”); Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265
(citing Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., 141 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1944)) (“The most
elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the
risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.”).
102. See Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
an antitrust plaintiff must prove injury causally linked to a violation “as a matter of fact and
with a fair degree of certainty”); E. Compton Timberlake, The Legal Injury Requirements and
Proof of Damages in Treble Damage Actions Under the Antitrust Laws, 30 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 231, 236 (1961) (noting that “the fact of damage [in private antitrust cases] must be
proved with certainty”).
103. As the Court in Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., observed:
[T]here is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the
fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof necessary
to enable the jury to fix the amount. . . . Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to
preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a
perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case,
while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be
enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and
reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate.
282 U.S. 555, 562–63 (1931). See Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 379 (“[T]he amount of
damages could not be determined by mere speculation or guess, but must be based on evidence
furnishing data from which the amount of the probable loss could be ascertained as a matter
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The measure of damages varies by antitrust offense. When the
antitrust violation takes the form of an exercise of monopoly power to
raise the price the violators charged, the presumptive measure of actual
damages suffered by purchasers is the overcharge, or the difference
between the price charged and the price that would have been charged
absent the violation, multiplied by the quantity purchased.104 When the
antitrust violation involves an unlawful exercise of monopsony power,
the presumptive measure of actual damages is the underpayment, or the
difference between the price received by the violator’s supplier and the
price that it would have received but for the violation, multiplied by the
of reasonable inference.”); Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 123 (recognizing “practical limits
of the burden of proof” in exclusion case); New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202
F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that burden of proving causal injury is greater than
burden of proving amount of damages); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 550 (7th
Cir. 1986) (“An antitrust plaintiff does not bear as onerous a burden in proving the dollar
amount of his damages as he does in showing the fact of his antitrust injury.”); Malley-Duff
& Assoc., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 148 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Story
Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563); MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1161 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing J. Truett Payne, 451 U.S. at 566–67) (“Once causation of
damages has been established, the amount of damages may be determined by a just and
reasonable estimate as long as the jury verdict is not the product of speculation or guess
work.”) (emphasis in original); Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers’ Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 25
(5th Cir. 1974) (“We emphasize that once the causation hurdle has been overcome, the expert
on damages need not be armed on the right hand with a slide rule, on the left hand with a
computer. He is allowed some economic imagination so long as it does not become fantasy.”);
South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767, 794 (6th Cir. 1970) (citing
Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 563) (“The antitrust cases are legion which reiterate the
proposition that, if the fact of damages is proven, the actual computation of damages may
suffer from minor imperfections.”); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Oliver, 364 F.2d 28, 35 (8th Cir.
1966) (citing Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 688 (1946)) (“When the
fact is certain that antitrust injury has been inflicted on a party, it is sufficient as a basis for
arriving at the damages that the evidence contains probative elements from which on
reasonable inference their extent can with judgment be estimated.”); K&G Men’s Co. v.
Carter, Civ. No. 10-309-JJB-SCR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95830, at *9–10 (M.D. La. Sept.
13, 2010) (first citing Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 265; and then citing Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at
379) (“After establishing that it has suffered damages, plaintiff must establish the amount of
damages, and the evidence supporting its claim must be reliable and the amount of damages
must not be speculative. Plaintiff’s damages need not be calculated with absolute certainty,
but there at least must be a reasonable basis for the computation.”) (citations omitted); see
also Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, “Speculative” Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L. REV.
423, 428 (1995) (arguing that “[s]peculativeness is primarily a deficiency in proof”).
104. See Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 374 (3d Cir.
2005) (citing ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES 172 (1996)) (“[T]he standard method of measuring damages in price
enhancement cases is overcharge, not lost profits.”); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc.
840 F.2d 1065, 1077 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489 (1968)) (“Where the antitrust violation is a price-fixing conspiracy,
the measure of damages to one of the coconspirators’ customers is the difference between the
prices actually paid and the prices that would have been paid absent the conspiracy.”).
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quantity it sold.105 When the antitrust plaintiff is a competitor who is
injured by the exclusionary conduct of the violators, the presumptive
measure of damages is the profits lost by the plaintiff as a result of the
unlawful conduct.106
B. The Indirect Purchaser Rules
The Illinois Brick doctrine generally bars remote buyers of pricefixed goods from suing sellers for antitrust damages.107 But two cases
decided before Illinois Brick undergird the doctrine. In Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., a shoe manufacturer sued to
recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act from a shoe machinery
manufacturer, which the courts had found in a government case had
monopolized the shoe machinery industry.108 The defendant argued that
the plaintiff had not been injured, as required to assert a claim under § 4,
because the plaintiff had passed on any overcharges attributable to its illgotten monopoly power to the plaintiff’s customers, or shoe buyers.109
The Court rejected the argument.110 The Court was skeptical that the realworld economic conditions necessary for an overcharge in its entirety to
be passed on to customers with no loss of profit could be established in
litigation.111 If the direct purchaser lost profits because of the overcharge,
perhaps by being forced to absorb some of it, the direct purchaser would
suffer an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the injury requirement of §
4.112

105. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 575–80 (10th Cir. 1961)
(recognizing that measure of damages caused by price-fixing conspiracy among buyers is
based on amount by which price was depressed from competitive price); 8 ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION (2d ed.) § 171.03[3][a][i] (“In monoposony [sic] cases, where
buyers exercise monopoly power over goods or services they purchase, the measure of
damages may be the lower price paid or undercharge.”); see also Sanner v. Bd. of Trade, 62
F.3d 918, 929 (7th Cir. 1995) (implying that damages suffered by farmers as a result of price
fixing in soybean purchase markets was measured by depression in soybean prices).
106. See Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 123–24 (endorsing lost profits as measure of
damages in exclusion case); Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 262–63 (holding that “a fair measure of the
damage” from exclusion is lost profits); LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 165 (3d Cir.
2005) (recognizing lost profits as the measure of damages in monopolization case); BAUER,
supra note 6, § 79.1(b)(2) (“When the defendant’s conduct excludes the plaintiff from a
market or drives it out of business, . . . the most common form of relief is either the firm’s
lost profits and/or the going concern value of the business.”).
107. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
108. 392 U.S. 481, 483–84 (1968).
109. See id. at 487–88, 491–92.
110. See id. at 492.
111. Id. at 492–93.
112. See id. at 493.
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The Court was also concerned that recognizing a pass-on defense
would allow an antitrust violator to prove that buyers at each successive
level down a distribution chain passed on the overcharge to their
customers, so that buyers at only the final level could recover. 113 But
those buyers would have incurred only a trivial increase in the price of
the finished good, such as the price increment in a pair of shoes
attributable to an overcharge in shoe machinery prices, and they likely
would have little interest in pursuing a class action.114 As a result,
antitrust violators would not be brought to task, and the treble-damage
remedy would become less effective.115
The Court recognized the possibility that the passing-on defense
might be permitted in some situations, explicitly identifying a “cost-plus”
contract, where an illegal overcharge would be added in full to the price
the direct purchaser would otherwise have charged its customer under a
pre-existing contract and sell the same quantity. 116 In these
circumstances, the direct purchaser would suffer no injury in fact.117
Otherwise, the Court rejected the passing-on defense, which meant that a
direct purchaser could recover as damages the entire overcharge imposed
by the antitrust violator regardless of whether that purchaser in fact
passed on part of that overcharge to its buyer.
In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., decided four years after Hanover
Shoe, the State of Hawaii sued for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act
for injury to its economy caused by a price-fixing conspiracy among oil
companies.118 The Court rejected the claim, primarily because permitting
the claim “would open the door to duplicative recoveries.” 119 Section 4
gives participants in the Hawaiian economy the right to recover damages
for injuries they suffer, and a “large and ultimately indeterminable part
of the injury to the ‘general economy,’ as it is measured by economists,
is no more than a reflection of the injuries to the ‘business or property’ of

113. See Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. The Court also noted that “where no differential can be proved between the price
unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was required by law to charge, establishing
damages might require a showing of loss of profits to the buyer.” Id. The suggestion is that in
such a case, the antitrust violation does not result in an overcharge, but the direct purchaser
may be able to recover its lost profits.
117. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1720 (1990).
118. 405 U.S. 251, 252–53 (1972).
119. Id. at 263–64.
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consumers.”120 Implicit in the Court’s reasoning is that the antitrust laws
impose a limit on antitrust damage liability, and duplicative recoveries
are impermissibly excessive.
In Illinois Brick, building purchasers, who happened to be
governmental entities, alleged that concrete block manufacturers
conspired to raise the price of block and sought damages under § 4.121
Block manufacturers sold their output to masonry contractors, who
included the price of the block in their bids to general contractors, whose
own bids to building owners incorporated the block price. 122 The Court
held that, with few exceptions, indirect purchasers do not have standing
under § 4 to recover damages based on overcharges imposed by antitrust
violators.123 The Court first concluded, with support of the parties, that
pass-on rules must be symmetrical. 124 If Hanover Shoe, which bars the
use of the pass-on theory by direct-purchasing defendants, stands,
indirect purchasers must be barred from recovering overcharge damages;
if indirect purchasers are allowed to recover, direct purchasers must be
allowed to assert the pass-on defense, and Hanover Shoe would have to
be overruled or severely restricted. 125 The possibility of allowing
offensive but not defensive use of the pass-on theory was all but
foreclosed by Hawaii. That case rests on the principle that § 4 does not
permit the imposition of multiple liability.126 Asymmetrical pass-on rules
favoring plaintiffs would allow indirect purchasers to recover damages
from absorbing some of the overcharge while preventing defendants from
avoiding liability to direct purchasers for the entire overcharge. 127
The Court, therefore, had to choose between allowing use of the
pass-on theory by both defendants and plaintiffs, a decision that would
mean overruling or narrowing Hanover Shoe, and prohibiting use by
both.128 The Court chose the latter.129 The Court reasoned that permitting
symmetrical use of the theory would dramatically increase litigation
costs, for potentially multiple levels of purchasers would have to be
120. Id. at 264. Congress amended § 4 of the Clayton Act in 1976 to permit parens patriae
actions by state attorneys general, cabining the right of action to avoid duplicative recoveries.
See 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2021).
121. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1977).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 736.
124. Id. at 728.
125. See id.
126. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730–31 (citing Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S.
251, 264 (1972)).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 736.
129. Id.
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involved, and proving the amount of overcharge absorbed at each level
would be difficult.130 Already complex antitrust litigation would become
more complex.131 Further, private antitrust enforcement is promoted by
concentrating the right to recover in a single distribution level. 132 As the
stakes increase, parties are more likely to incur the expected costs of
litigation.
The Court observed that § 4 serves two purposes: deterrence and
compensation.133 One can argue on economic grounds that deterrence is
the more important purpose, for if a remedy effectively deters a violation,
no compensation is required.134 The Court took a different tack.
Prohibiting indirect purchasers from recovering could frustrate the
legitimate goal of compensation, but if indirect-purchaser suits were
allowed, many indirect purchasers would have suffered such small losses
that they would not bother to collect damages obtained in class actions
brought on their behalf.135 Further, much of the compensation to which
they would be entitled would be consumed in expenses incurred in
litigating pass-on amounts. Permitting offensive use of pass-on,
therefore, would not result in meaningful compensation for indirect
purchasers.136 In short, the benefits of efficient deterrence outweigh the
costs of imperfect compensation.
130. See id. at 730–33.
131. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730–33.
132. See id. at 745–46. Direct purchasers are the most appropriate recipients of the right to
recover all damages because their proximity to the offenders results in information costs of
detecting a violation that are lower than the costs incurred by indirect purchasers. See William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the
Antitrust Laws?: An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602,
609 (1979).
133. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746 (quoting Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494).
134. See Landes & Posner, supra note 132, at 605; see also KENNETH G. ELZINGA &
WILLIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 96 (1976) (arguing for antitrust fines as the
efficient antitrust remedy because the compensatory remedy established in the statutory right
to treble damages is an inefficient method of achieving deterrence).
135. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 747.
136. One can argue that expected damages recoveries by direct purchasers will be passed
on to indirect purchasers, so that indirect purchasers will be compensated through reductions
in the price of the goods. See Landes & Posner, supra note 132, at 605 (explaining that indirect
purchasers “obtain, in the form of lower prices, a benefit equivalent to the anticipated value
of the antitrust damage claims that they are denied, discounted for the uncertainties of
recovery”); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2002)
(“The prospect of recovery also acts like a cents-off coupon to the initial buyer, which given
competition at the distribution stage is forced to pass on this anticipated discount, and so
protects remote customers from the effects of the cartel if deterrence fails.”); see generally
John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer Interest, 48
ANTITRUST BULL. 531 (2003) (arguing that indirect purchaser suits by consumers, which are
permitted under some state laws, did not result in significant compensation).
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The Court rejected proposals to carve out broad exceptions to
Hanover Shoe, which would have allowed symmetrical use of pass on for
particular types of markets, such as those in which “middlemen . . . resell
goods without altering them” or “contractors . . . add a fixed percentage
markup to the cost of their materials in submitting bids.”137 The Court
reasoned that determining whether an exception applied would entail just
the kind of litigation complexity that Hanover Shoe wanted to avoid.138
The Court noted that Hanover Shoe had given only one example of a
situation in which a pass-on defense “might be permitted,” that being a
cost-plus contract,139 and it suggested that the pass-on defense might be
permitted as well “where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by
its customer.”140 Most likely the Court meant to include if not describe
the situation where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
supplier,141 and the exception so understood fits comfortably within the
rationale of Illinois Brick. Both in the context of the cost-plus contract
and the ownership-or-control circumstance, the administrative costs of
calculating the amount of overcharge incurred by the indirect purchaser
are relatively low. Moreover, in the latter context, the function of antitrust
damages as a deterrent is undercut by a rigid application of Illinois Brick
because the direct purchaser will have no incentive to sue its affiliated
supplier.142 The Court thus implied that any exceptions to the symmetrical
137. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 743.
138. See id. at 744–45.
139. Id. at 735–36.
140. Id. at 736 n.16 (citing Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969)).
141. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th
Cir. 1997) (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16) (“Utilicorp implies that the only
exceptions to the Illinois Brick doctrine are those stated in Illinois Brick itself—’where the
direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer,’ . . . or, we suppose, vice versa.”); In
re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981) (citing In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1160–61 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he unanimous view
is that the exception applies not only where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its
customer, but also where it is owned or controlled by its supplier.”).
142. The lower courts have emphasized this rationale for the ownership-or-control
exception. See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145–46 (9th
Cir. 2003) (citing Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.
1980)) (finding indirect purchaser had standing where direct purchaser owned antitrust
violator because “indirect purchasers can sue for damages if there is no realistic possibility
that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust violation.”); Royal Printing
Co., 621 F.2d at 326 (noting that “Illinois Brick does not bar an indirect purchaser’s suit where
the direct purchaser is a division or subsidiary of a co-conspirator” because the likelihood of
a suit by the direct purchaser is small). Courts have relied on the ownership-or-control
exception to allow purchasers to sue their suppliers when those suppliers, though not owned
or controlled by their own suppliers, enter into a vertical conspiracy with their suppliers,
calling this the “co-conspirator,” or “vertical conspiracy,” exception to Illinois Brick. In such
a case, the plaintiff is an indirect purchaser from the higher-level vertical conspirator. See,
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pass-on rules would be narrow, recognized only when necessary to serve
the objectives of the indirect-purchaser rules.
The Court later emphasized its reluctance to recognize exceptions.
In Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., it denied standing to natural gas
consumers who alleged that gas pipelines and production companies
conspired to raise prices charged to gas utilities, who included the
overcharge in the regulated prices they charged consumers.143 The directpurchasing utilities separately sued, and the Court concluded that even
though the direct purchasers and indirect purchasers sought different,
non-duplicative damages, thus eliminating the rationale of Illinois Brick
based on the risk of multiple recovery, recognizing an exception would
complicate litigation, another Illinois Brick concern.144 The Court
pointedly referred to a cost-plus contract as a “possib[le]” exception but
concluded that sale by a direct-purchasing regulated utility does not fall
within the principle underlying such an exception anyway because the
indirect purchasers did not establish that “the direct purchaser will bear
no portion of the overcharge and otherwise suffer no injury.”145 The Court

e.g., In re Nat’l Football League’s Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1157 (9th
Cir. 2019) (allowing purchaser from vertical output-reducing conspiracy to maintain action
for damages); Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing
Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1984)); Shamrock Foods Co.,
729 F.2d at 1212 (citing Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th
Cir. 1980)) (endorsing rule adopted by “[n]umerous other courts” that Illinois Brick is
“inapplicable to claims against remote sellers when the plaintiffs allege that the sellers
conspired with intermediates in the distribution chain to fix the price at which the plaintiffs
purchased”); Fontana Aviation, Inc., 617 F.2d at 481; Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907
F. Supp. 2d 465, 480–83, 482 n.94 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Judge Easterbrook has asserted that,
rather than referring to the vertical-conspiracy situation as an “exception” to the indirect
purchaser rule, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick should be understood to establish a rule
“allocat[ing] to the first non-conspirator in the distribution chain the right to collect 100% of
the damages.” Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2002);
see Marion Healthcare, LLC v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 952 F.3d 832, 839 (7th Cir. 2020)
(following Paper Systems in holding that purchasers from distributors that conspired with
manufacturer were not barred by Illinois Brick; the “conspiracy ‘exception’ . . . is not so much
a real exception as it is a way of determining which firm, or group of firms collectively, should
be considered to be the relevant seller (and from that, identifying which one is the direct
purchaser) for purposes of the [Illinois Brick] rule”).
143. See 497 U.S. 199, 204, 208 (1990).
144. See id. at 212–13.
145. Id. at 218. The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner, had held that
consumers in the setting of regulated rates did fall within the cost-plus contract exception (see
Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 852 F.2d 891, 899 (7th Cir. 1988)),
and Judge Posner as an academic was a leading proponent of Illinois Brick. See Landes &
Posner, supra note 132, at 603. The Supreme Court accepted certiorari in Utilicorp to resolve
a conflict between the Tenth Circuit, which had barred the utility customers’ action, and the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Panhandle. See Utilicorp, 497 U.S. at 206. The fact that the
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thus reserved the possible exception typified by a cost-plus contract to
cases in which the direct purchaser obviously suffered no loss
whatsoever. The Court observed generally, “[E]ven assuming that any
economic assumptions underlying the Illinois Brick rule might be
disproved in a specific case, we think it an unwarranted and
counterproductive exercise to litigate a series of exceptions.”146
The Court’s indirect-purchaser cases are antitrust-standing
decisions. In sum, they establish that direct purchasers have standing to
recover damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act and indirect purchasers do
not. Any exceptions to these rules are narrow. The rules apply whether
the underlying antitrust offense is a violation of § 1 or § 2 of the Sherman
Act, where the measure of the plaintiff’s injury is an overcharge. 147 When
the allegation is that an antitrust defendant has unlawfully increased the
price of a good, the pass-on theory is implicated, and the principles apply.
All these Supreme Court cases involve defendants who sold products. But
§ 1 prohibits conspiracies among buyers to decrease the price paid for
goods,148 and § 2 prohibits the unlawful acquisition and exploitation of
Supreme Court rejected an exception for consumers paying regulated rates indicates how
narrow the Court intended any exceptions to be.
146. Id. at 217. Another situation in which Illinois Brick has been held not to bar a suit by
an indirect purchaser is that in which the indirect purchaser sues merely for prospective
equitable relief, a case that would not be brought under § 4 of the Clayton Act but under § 16.
See, e.g., Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Astellas U.S., LLC, 763 F.3d 1280, 1290 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d at 1167); Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n
of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lucas Auto. Eng’g, Inc. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 140 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1998)); McCarthy v. Recordex
Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1996). The complexities of apportionment and the risk
of multiple liability disappear when only an injunction is sought. Courts have held, however,
that Illinois Brick bars indirect-purchaser suits for the equitable remedy of disgorgement
under § 16, because even if these suits do not complicate litigation by requiring the calculation
of pass-on percentages, they do pose a threat of multiple liability. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Ferrellgas
Partners, L.P. (In re Pre-Filled Propane Tank Antitrust Litig.), 893 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (8th
Cir. 2018); FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc. 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 41–42 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Illinois
Brick, 431 U.S. at 741). Though suits for prospective injunctive relief do not raise either of
the concerns identified in Illinois Brick, the dissenting justices in Apple implied that they are
barred because indirect purchasers are not proximately injured by an antitrust violation and
therefore lack antitrust standing. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1527 n.1 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118,
135 (2014)).
147. Customers alleging that their supplier violated Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2021),
by engaging in tying or exclusive dealing also would seek damages measured by an
overcharge, and the indirect-purchaser rules would apply to them as well. See In re Keurig
Green Mt. Singleserve Coffee Antitrust Litig., 383 F. Supp. 3d 187, 209, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(recognizing that direct purchaser but not indirect purchasers had standing to assert claims
based in part on Clayton Act § 3).
148. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 227
(1948) (concluding that complaint alleging a conspiracy among sugar refiners to depress the
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monopsony power.149 Buyers who exploit market power typically make
underpayments to their suppliers. The Court’s reasoning in crafting
indirect-purchaser rules applies with equal force to cases in which a buyer
or group of buyers exercise market power. 150 Direct sellers to an antitrust
violator exercising monopsony power have standing to sue for damages
based on the underpayment; indirect sellers do not.
The indirect-purchaser rules assume that goods are sold. For reasons
apart from the application of the antitrust standing doctrine, the Court has
grappled with the implications of consignment. In Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons & Co., the Court held that resale price
maintenance agreements between a supplier and distributor were illegal
per se.151 Firms might be able to avoid the rule if sellers consigned rather
than sold goods to distributors. The Court at first concluded that a
consignment agreement under which the price charged by the agent is set
by the principal does not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. 152 Indeed, no
one would argue that an artist setting the price a gallery can charge for
his or her painting entered into an illegal vertical price-fixing
agreement.153 The Court, though, drastically narrowed its holding nearly
forty years later and held that consignment agreements fixing the
consignee’s price, at least when used throughout a vast distribution
system in which the agents serve the same economic function as ordinary
distributors, do violate § 1.154 One lower court, examining the Supreme
Court’s teaching, concluded that the test of illegality is “whether the
agency relationship has a function other than to circumvent the rule
against price fixing.”155 When the Supreme Court repudiated the per se
rule against resale price maintenance in favor of the rule of reason,156 the

prices paid to sugar beet growers stated an antitrust cause of action under § 1 as well as § 2
of the Sherman Act).
149. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312,
325 (2007) (recognizing that predatory bidding by a buyer can violate § 2 just as predatory
pricing by a seller can do so).
150. See, e.g., Zinser v. Cont’l Grain Co., 660 F.2d 754, 760–61 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding
that the Illinois Brick rule applies when antitrust violators depress prices paid to suppliers);
see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1158–59 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
that in general indirect sellers to antitrust violators are barred from suing for damages under
Illinois Brick).
151. 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911).
152. See United States v. GE Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926).
153. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 18, 21 (1964) (recognizing that
“[o]ne who sends a rug or a painting or other work of art to a merchant or a gallery for sale at
a minimum price can, of course, hold the consignee to the bargain”).
154. See id. at 21–22.
155. Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436 (7th Cir. 1986).
156. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007).
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significance of the consignment cases waned. 157 Nevertheless, the
possibility of consignment potentially complicates indirect-purchaser
rules to the extent those rules are dependent on the sale of goods. For
example, if the purchaser of goods is functioning as the agent of ultimate
customers, those customers might be deemed the direct purchasers for
purposes of an antitrust claim against the initial suppliers.158
To summarize, three principles emerge from the Court’s pass-on
cases. First, private parties have the right to recover the entire overcharge
caused by an antitrust violation. Second, private parties may not recover
more than the entire overcharge. Third, antitrust standing rules should
accomplish the objective of optimal recovery as efficiently as possible.
These principles apply analogously and with equal force when an
antitrust violation results in an underpayment.
II. APPLE INC. V. PEPPER & PLATFORM CASES
In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, the Court confronted the application of the
indirect purchaser rules to a platform market. Apple, the seller of the
iPhone, through contract and technological limitations requires iPhone
users to obtain apps solely through Apple’s App Store.159 Apps perform
the myriad functions for which a modern “smartphone” can be used. Apps
are written to specific operating systems used in smartphones, and so, for
instance, an app written for the iOS in an Apple iPhone will not function
on a smartphone running the Android operating system. The App Store
at the time of the Court’s decision contained some 2 million apps.160 Most
apps are created by independent developers, who contract with Apple to
make their apps available to iPhone owners in the App Store. iPhone
owners, or consumers, then purchase and download apps from the App
Store. To sell an app in the App Store, app developers must pay Apple a
157. The significance waned but did not disappear. See Valuepest.com of Charlotte, Inc. v.
Bayer Corp., 561 F.3d 282, 287–88 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that Leegin did not overrule cases
excluding consignment agreements from the ambit of the per se rule against vertical price
fixing in favor of rule-of-reason analysis).
158. See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 720 F. App’x 835, 837 (9th
Cir. 2017) (implying that members of buyers’ cooperative rather than cooperative itself would
be direct purchasers from suppliers if cooperative served as agent of members); see also
Diskin v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6374 (MBM), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9129,
at *12–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding sufficient facts to support determination that retailers of
daily racing form were agents of publisher so that customers were direct purchasers from
publisher); see also In re Toilet Seat Antitrust Litig., No. 75-184, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14904, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that purchasing company functioned as agent of its
customer such that customer was the direct purchaser of goods procured by company from
supplier).
159. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019).
160. Id.
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ninety-nine dollar annual membership fee.161 App developers set their
own retail prices for apps, though Apple requires the prices to end in
$0.99.162 Apple keeps thirty percent of the sales price as a commission.163
Consumers alleged that Apple monopolized the retail market for the sale
of iPhone apps in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act and consequently
charges supra-competitive prices.164 They sought damages under § 4 of
the Clayton Act. Apple responded that iPhone owners are not direct
purchasers of apps from Apple and that their claim, therefore, is barred
under Illinois Brick.
The Court decided 5–4 in an opinion written by Justice Kavanaugh
that the Illinois Brick rule does not bar the iPhone owners’ suit. The Court
ultimately found Apple a simple case: Illinois Brick allows only direct
purchasers from an antitrust violator to sue for overcharge damages;
iPhone owners bought apps directly from Apple; iPhone owners may sue
Apple.165 The Court observed that its conclusion was supported by the
text of § 4 as well as its indirect-purchaser precedents, citing UtiliCorp
and Illinois Brick:166 “Illinois Brick established a bright-line rule that
authorizes suits by direct purchasers but bars suits by indirect
purchasers.”167 “The absence of an intermediary [between Apple and the
consumer] is dispositive.”168 End of story.
The Court rejected Apple’s proposed rule that “Illinois Brick allows
consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether or not
that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining party.” 169
The rule would apply most naturally in consignment cases, where the
principal sets the price of the product to be charged by the agent. The
proposed rule would allow consumers to sue the principal, if he or she
committed an antitrust offense that injured them, but not the agent. Such

161. Id.
162. Id. The economic implications of Apple’s ninety-nine-cent rule are not explored in
this article.
163. Id. Since the Court decided Apple, the company announced that in 2021 it would lower
its commission to fifteen percent for developers that generate no more than one million dollars
in revenue from its software platform. See Tim Higgins & Sarah E. Needleman, Apple Slashes
App Store Fees for Smaller Developers, WALL ST. J. (updated Nov. 18, 2020, 5:23 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-under-antitrust-scrutiny-halves-app-store-fee-forsmaller-developers-11605697203. The analysis in this article is not affected by the level of
commission.
164. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1519.
165. Id. at 1520.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1521.
169. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1521.
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a theory, according to the Court, contradicts statutory text and
precedent,170 unlike its conclusion, which is supported by both.
Further, the proposed rule is economically and legally unpersuasive
because it “would draw an arbitrary and unprincipled line” based on the
form of relationship between retailers and their suppliers.171
Arrangements between a supplier and retailer can take many forms, such
as a traditional markup pricing model and a commission pricing model.
In a markup model, a retailer buys the product from a supplier at one
price, then sells it at a higher price. The Court explained that, for example,
a retailer with monopoly power might pay six dollars to the supplier, sell
the product for ten dollars, and keep four dollars.172 In a commission
model, the retailer does not buy the product from a supplier but agrees
that it will sell the product for a specified price and retain a specified
commission.173 Thus, the retailer with monopoly power might agree with
the supplier to sell the product for ten dollars and keep forty-percent of
the sales price as a commission; the supplier receives six dollars, and the
retailer retains four dollars.174 The positions of the consumer, supplier,
and retailer in the markup model are identical to those in the commission
model, yet Apple’s proposed rule would allow the consumer to sue the
retailer in the markup model but not the commission model.175 The
disparate legal treatment would invite monopolistic retailers to insulate
themselves from liability by using the commission model.176
The Court also observed that the reasons for the Illinois Brick rule
cut against the proposed rule and in favor of the Court’s conclusion.
Those reasons, which mirror the principles identified above,177 are as
follows: “(1) facilitating more effective enforcement of antitrust laws; (2)
avoiding complicated damages calculations; and (3) eliminating
duplicative damages against antitrust defendants.”178 Enforcement is
enhanced under a rule that will allow consumers to sue monopolistic
retailers even if suppliers can sue them as well. 179 Damage calculations
may be complicated, but that is not a sufficient reason to preclude
recovery. They will require expert testimony to determine the price in a
competitive retail market, but that is not unusual in an antitrust case.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 1522.
Id.
Id. at 1531.
Id.
Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1531.
See id. at 1522.
Id. at 1523.
See supra text following note 168.
Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1524.
See id.
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Further, the calculations might be just as complicated in a markup case
as in a commission case, yet Apple’s rule would permit the consumer’s
action in the former.180 Finally, the Court asserted its rule does not expose
retailers to multiple liability because consumers asserting monopolization
and suppliers asserting monopsonization against the same retailer would
be seeking different measures of damages.181 They would not be fighting
over a common fund with the possibility of duplicative recoveries, as in
the indirect-purchaser context examined in Illinois Brick.182
When an antitrust violator sells a product to a customer at an inflated
price, the indirect-purchaser rules permit that customer but not its
customers to recover damages. Is this because only the first customer
transacts with the violator or because only the first customer is
proximately injured by the violation? In a typical setting, the direct
purchaser satisfies both the transaction condition and the proximatecause condition. Justice Gorsuch, writing for four dissenting justices,
argued that Illinois Brick merely applied a long-standing statutory
requirement of proximate cause.183 Purchasers who are injured because
an overcharge imposed by an antitrust violator is passed on to them
through intermediate purchasers have no antitrust standing because any
injuries they suffer are not proximately caused by the violator. That they
do not contract directly with the violator is unimportant:
Illinois Brick held that . . . convoluted ‘pass on’ theories of damages
violate traditional principles of proximate causation . . . [The Court]
recast[s] Illinois Brick as a rule forbidding only suits where the plaintiff
does not contract directly with the defendant. This replaces a rule of
proximate cause and economic reality with an easily manipulated and
formalistic rule of contractual privity.184

The dissenters argued that the rule of proximate cause permits only
app developers to sue Apple for damages. According to the dissenters,
the 30% commission falls initially on the developers. So if the
commission is in fact a monopolistic overcharge, the developers are the
parties who are directly injured by it. Plaintiffs can be injured only if
the developers are able and choose to pass on the overcharge to them in
the form of higher app prices that the developers alone control.185

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See id.
See id. at 1525.
See id. at 1524–25.
Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1525–26 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See id.
Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1528 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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The dissenters claimed that the iPhone owners’ damages claim “is
exactly the kind of ‘pass-on theory’ Illinois Brick rejected.”186 The
plaintiffs’ theory, adopted by the Court, “will necessitate a complex
inquiry into how Apple’s conduct affected third-party pricing
decisions.”187
The dissenters believed that the Court’s decision conflicts with two
of the principles underlying Illinois Brick: administrative efficiency and
avoidance of duplicative liability. Determining the extent to which a
commission charged a developer for sale of an app on a platform is
reflected in the price paid by the consumer will inevitably be complicated,
implying high costs of litigation. Further, if the commission reflects a
monopoly overcharge, the platform can in no event be held liable in
damages for more than the amount of the commission.188 The app
developers have a claim, and the Court’s decision, according to the
dissenters, must mean that Hanover Shoe is overruled, thus allowing
Apple to reduce its liability to them to the extent they passed on
overcharges to consumers.189 Consumers may recover for the portion of
the commission they absorbed, and so the platform is at risk of excessive
liability unless developers and consumers are joined in a single suit,
representing precisely the kind of litigation complexity Illinois Brick
sought to avoid.
The dissenters took direct aim at the Court’s assertion that
distinguishing between a markup and a commission distribution
arrangement would be arbitrary. The dissenters claimed that allowing
only consumers to sue when a retailer uses a markup model and only
suppliers to sue when it uses a commission model is consistent with a rule
of proximate cause, and using that rule is not arbitrary. In the markup
model, “the markup falls initially on the consumer, so there’s no doubt
that the retailer’s anticompetitive conduct proximately caused the
consumer’s injury.”190 In the commission model, however, “the
commission falls initially on the manufacturer, and the consumer won’t
feel the pain unless the manufacturer can and does recoup some or all of

186. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
187. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 1529 n.3 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Apple charged only one commission on
each sale. So even assuming for argument’s sake that the 30% commission was entirely
illegal, Apple can only be required to pay out in damages, at most the full amount it received
in commissions”).
189. See id. at 1529 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
190. Apple, 139 S. Ct. at 1531 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
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the elevated commission by raising its own prices.” 191 When the retailer
charges a commission, consumers can’t establish proximate cause.
Apple was not the first case in which a court grappled with the issue
of standing to sue a platform for damages. The Ninth Circuit in Apple,
which had held that iPhone owners did have standing, disagreed with an
Eighth Circuit decision denying consumer standing in “a transaction
closely resembling” the Apple transaction.192 In Campos v. Ticketmaster
Corp.,193 concertgoers alleged that a ticket distribution service,
Ticketmaster, unlawfully monopolized ticket distribution services to
large-scale popular music shows. It acquired monopoly power by
entering into exclusive dealing arrangements with promoters, which
allowed it to force venues and consumers to use its services.194
Consumers transacted directly with Ticketmaster, which charged them
supra-competitive ticketing fees “as high as twenty dollars per ticket.”195
The court found that the “billing practices” were not determinative.196
The court, 2-1, held that the consumers’ suit was barred by Illinois Brick,
and it implied that the venues were the proper plaintiffs to challenge any
monopolization by the ticket distributor. 197 Dissenting, Judge Arnold
argued that Illinois Brick bars an action by a purchaser only when an
antecedent transaction (1) occurred “in a direct vertical chain of
transactions” and (2) “resulted in the ‘passing on’ of monopoly costs from
the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser.”198 Neither condition was
satisfied here. The monopoly product was ticket distribution services.
Ticketmaster supplies the product to concertgoers, and the entirety of the
assumed overcharge is borne by concertgoers.199 The Circuit Court in
Apple agreed with Judge Arnold.200

191. Id. (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
192. Pepper v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313, 323–24 (9th Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1514,
1518 (2019).
193. 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 3d at 1169.
196. Id. at 1171 (citing McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., 80 F.3d 842, 853 n.18 (3d Cir. 1996)).
197. Id. at 1174.
198. Campos, 140 F.3d at 1174. (Arnold, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)).
199. See id. (Arnold, J., dissenting). In fact, economic theory predicts that venues would
anticipate the overcharge in the fee imposed on concertgoers and would price tickets lower
than they would otherwise. The overcharge, therefore, would impose a cost on venues. See
infra text following note 250.
200. See Pepper v. Apple Inc., 846 F.3d 313, 323 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Campos v.
Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1166 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting)).
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III. PLATFORM ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST
In many markets, a supplier sells a good to a purchaser, and the
purchaser either combines the good with other inputs and sells the output
to customers or simply resells the good to customers. Either way, from
the standpoint of the initial purchaser, the good can be considered an
input. A supermarket, for instance, buys products from suppliers at
wholesale and resells them to consumers at retail. A platform is different,
and no one doubts that Apple functions as a platform when it transacts
with app developers and iPhone owners. The question is whether the
economics of platforms affects antitrust standing.
A platform provides services to at least two different groups of users,
who interact with each other. It is an intermediary in a two-sided or multisided market. One can define a two-sided market broadly as “one in
which (1) two sides of agents interact through an intermediary or
platform, and (2) the decisions of each set of agents affect the outcomes
of the other set of agents, typically through an externality.”201 The second
condition is generally referred to as a network effect. 202 Network effects
can be direct or indirect.203 Direct network effects are demand-side scale
economies or diseconomies, though only economies need be considered
here. Thus, direct network effects arise when the value derived from a
service by one user increases with the number of other users of the
service. A classic example is telephone service: As the number of actors
subscribing to the service increases, the value each subscriber obtains
increases, for the number of individuals with whom any subscriber can
communicate increases. Indirect network effects arise when the value to
one group of users of some service depends on the number of a different
group of users of services the platform provides.204 The service provider
201. Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 125
(2009) (The text mistakenly uses “affects,” plural).
202. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM ECON. REV. 424, 424–25 (1985); see also Michael L Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994); Oz Shy,
A Short Survey of Network Economics, 38 REV. INDUS. ECON. 119, 119–20 (2011); S. J.
Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Effects and Externalities, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 671 (Peter Newmann ed., 1998); Willima H. Page
& John E. Lopatka, Network Externalities, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 952,
966 (Boudwijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Nicholas Economides, The
Economics of Networks, 14 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 673, 678 (1996).
203. See Matthew T. Clements, Direct and Indirect Network Effects: Are They Equivalent?,
22 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 633, 633–34 (2004) (explaining difference between and direct and
indirect network effects and arguing that they influence technological standardization
differently).
204. See, e.g., David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,
20 YALE J. REG. 325, 332 (2003); see also Jean-Pierre Dubé et al., Tipping and Concentration
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is a platform, or an intermediary that facilitates transactions between the
two groups of users.205 For example, the Windows operating system
functions as a platform.206 The value a user derives from owning a
computer running Windows depends on the number of apps written for
Windows; the value an app developer derives from writing an app for
Windows depends on the number of individuals using a computer running
Windows. Even if the definition of a two-sided market does not include
the existence of indirect network effects,207 nearly all two-sided markets
exhibit them.208
A platform can charge for its services through access fees and usage
fees.209 As the names imply, an access fee is a lump-sum charge that
allows the customer access to customers in the other group; a cover
charge to enter a nightclub where one wants to meet members of the
opposite sex is an example.210 A usage fee is a charge imposed on a
transaction between members of the two groups. The charge a payment
system’s company imposes on a merchant when a customer uses the
company’s card to make a purchase is a usage fee. A platform can use
in Markets with Indirect Network Effects, 29 MARKETING SCI. 216, 218 (2010) (describing
positive indirect network effects).
205. Different kinds of platforms can be identified. For example, Evans and Schmalensee
distinguish among market-makers, audience-makers, and demand-coordinators. See Evans,
supra note 204, at 334–35; see also DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,
MATCHMAKERS 18 (2016). Apple is a demand-coordinator. It provides services, in the form
of the iOS, that generate indirect network effects across two groups, app developers and
iPhone owners. See Evans, supra note 204, at 335. Google, a competitor in the mobile phone
platform market, is also a demand-coordinator, but it operates in a three-sided market, selling
the Android operating system to handset manufacturers, app developers, and phone owners.
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 205, at 35.
206. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Operating
systems . . . function as platforms for software applications”).
207. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990, 1017–18 (2006).
208. See Evans, supra note 204, at 338 (“Multi-sided platform markets . . . are subject to
indirect network effects.”); see also Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 1017 (“Our premise
is that many (probably most) markets with network externalities are two- (or multiple-) sided
markets”). The central role of indirect network effects in the analysis of two-sided markets
implies that the analysis of indirect network effects substantially overlaps with the analysis of
platforms. See Rysman, supra note 201, at 127 (“The emphasis on market intermediaries is
the main distinction between the literature on two-sided markets and the literature on network
effects, and on indirect network effects in particular”).
209. See David Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets
with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 151, 160 (2007). An access fee can
also be called a “participation fee.” See Rysman, supra note 201, at 131.
210. See Julian Wright, One-sided Logic in Two-sided Markets, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON.
44, 46, n.3 (noting that “[s]ome clubs have a lower cover charge or free entry for women,
while others offer a ladies-night in which women pay nothing to enter the club on a given
night”).
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one or the other kind of fee or both. Apple imposes both an access fee
and, when iPhone owners download apps, usage fees.211 The imposition
of access fees and usage fees is a form of two-part pricing, familiar
outside the context of platforms. 212 As in other uses, two-part pricing by
platforms can facilitate price discrimination, which can increase social
welfare and the rents of the price discriminator. 213
The two-sidedness of a market has several implications for the
conduct of the platform and for the application of antitrust law. Critically,
when the platform sets the price it charges one group of customers, it
must take into account not only the quantity effects on that side of the
market but also the effects that the quantity on the first side of the market
would have on the other side.214 For instance, if Apple lowered the price
of iPhones, more consumers would likely buy them. Considering only
iPhone owners, the price reduction might or might not be profitable. But
the larger number of iPhone users would also increase the price app
developers would be willing to pay Apple for access to the larger base of
app customers. A price reduction in iPhones might be profitable only
because of the additional revenue Apple would earn from app developers.
Of course, the larger number of apps written for the iPhone would make
owning an iPhone that much more valuable, potentially increasing the
price Apple could charge consumers for the iPhone. A platform’s pricing
decisions must account for the feedback effects, or the interaction
between the sides of the market.
Although the size of each group may affect the other group in a twosided market, the effect may be stronger for one group than the other. In
general, a platform will set a low price to members of the group that exerts
the larger positive externality, which allows it to set a higher price to
members of the other group. 215 The low price need not even cover

211. Apple charges developers a ninety-nine dollar annual membership fee. Apple Inc. v.
Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019). The price Apple charges customers for an iPhone could
incorporate an access charge. Id. Apple charges a thirty percent commission on transactions
between developers and iPhone owners. Id.
212. See generally Nikolaos Vettas, Two-part Tariffs, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF ECONOMICS (2011) (observing that “[a] two‐part tariff is a pricing scheme according to
which the buyer pays to the seller a fixed fee and a constant charge for each unit of the product
or service purchased” and giving examples of its use).
213. See, e.g., Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON.
668, 669 (2006) (noting that “[b]ecause externalities are lessened with per-transaction
charging, it is plausible that platform profit is higher when this form of charging is used”).
214. See, e.g., Rysman, supra note 201, at 129.
215. See Armstrong, supra note 213, at 668–69; see also Evans, supra note 204, at 343.
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marginal costs; it may be zero or negative, as it would be if the platform
provided rewards.216
Another variable that can affect optimal pricing in two-sided
markets is the presence of multihoming, which is the use of more than
one platform by an agent.217 A consumer, for example, might use several
different credit cards. In the credit services platform, the other side of the
market consisting of merchants may also multihome by accepting
different kinds of credit cards. Multihoming implies that platforms offer
differentiated services, for otherwise an agent would have no reason to
use more than one platform. In some markets, however, one side of a
market multihomes while the other side does not. 218 For example, few
consumers have more than one mobile phone; they might be said to single
home. App developers may produce apps for more than one mobile
operating system; they multihome.219 Multihoming presupposes
competition. When platforms are competing, the platforms have an
incentive to attract members of the single homing group with low prices;
the larger group of members on that side of the market will increase
demand on the other side of the market, allowing the platform to charge
members of that group higher prices.220
One antitrust implication of the economics of two-sided markets is
that a proper analysis of the competitive effects of a platform’s conduct
must account for both sides of the market. The Supreme Court recognized
this principle in Ohio v. American Express Co., which involved antisteering provisions in contracts between a credit card company and
merchants who accepted the card. 221 The provisions prevented these
merchants from steering customers away from use of the card at the point
of sale and toward another service provider’s card where the other service
provider charges merchants less.222 The Court recognized that the credit
card company operated in a two-sided market, and it held that the firm’s
conduct would not violate the rule of reason unless it had anticompetitive
effects in the market as a whole.223
A second implication is that whether a platform has monopoly
power depends upon a proper definition of the market, or more
216. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 205, at 33.
217. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 991–92.
218. Rysman observes that “two-sided markets often seem to evolve toward a situation
where members of one side use a single platform and the other side uses multiple platforms.”
Rysman, supra note 201, at 130.
219. See Evans, supra, note 204, at 346.
220. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 993, 1008.
221. 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
222. Id. at 2283.
223. See id. at 2287.
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accurately, a proper accounting of all the competitive constraints
affecting a platform’s conduct.224 A platform may compete against some
firms on one side of a market and against none or different firms on the
other, and it may compete against other platforms on both sides. An
analysis of a platform’s economic power then depends upon its position
in a complicated market, perhaps a multi-platform market. Indeed, the
American Express Court instructed that a single market should be defined
comprising both sides of a platform when indirect network effects on both
sides are strong.225 “A market should be treated as one sided when the
impacts of indirect network effects and relative pricing in that market are
minor.”226 For a transaction platform—a particular kind of platform in
which the platform “cannot make a sale to one side of the platform
without simultaneously making a sale to the other”227—indirect network
effects are strong, and the market must be defined to include both sides.
Even though iPhone owners buy apps from Apple through the App Store,
Apple operates a transaction platform. The economic if not legal
transaction is between the developer and the iPhone owner, for the iPhone
owner receives the app in exchange for a payment ultimately received by
the developer. For every sale of an app by a developer, there is a purchase
by an iPhone owner, albeit mediated by Apple. There is a one-to-one
correspondence between the developer’s sale and the owner’s purchase.

224. See David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate
Two-Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 697 (2005) (arguing against
mechanical approaches to market definition when two-sided platforms are at issue but in favor
of taking into account all constraints on business behavior).
225. See American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
226. Id. at 2286.
227. Id. at 2280. Notably, the Court does not say that a single market comprising both sides
of a platform should only be defined for transaction platforms; transaction platforms, it says,
are one kind of platform in which indirect network effects are strong, but strong indirect
network effects is the condition that justifies defining the single market comprising both sides.
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit suggested that American Express is limited to transaction
platforms. See US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2019).
Further, Filistrucchi et al., argue that only transaction markets should be defined as single
markets. Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien Geradin, Eric Van Damme, & Pauline Affeldt, Market
Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 293, 301
(2014) (“Whether one should define a single market or two interrelated markets depends on
whether we are dealing with a two-sided transaction market or a two-sided non-transaction
market.”); see also US Airways, Inc., 938 F.3d at 58 (holding that a travel global distribution
system “is a transaction platform, and the relevant market for such a platform must as a matter
of law include both sides”); see also United States v. Sabre Corp., 452 F. Supp. 3d 97, 136
(D. Del. Apr. 7, 2020) (concluding travel global distribution systems are two-sided transaction
platforms and market consists only of these platforms for Clayton Act § 7 purposes). Because
Apple is a transaction platform, the full reach of American Express is not important here.
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The critical feature is that Apple can charge a price both for joining the
platform and for using it.228
A platform can have monopoly power, and it can acquire that power
unlawfully. The economics of two-sided markets do not imply that
platforms are incapable of violating § 2. Evidence that a platform
restricted access to one group of agents by another group of agents,
however, proves neither that the platform has monopoly power nor that
the conduct is anticompetitive. When one side of a market multihomes
and the other side does not, for example, the platform’s optimal pricing
strategy is to charge low prices to the single homing side and high prices
to the multihoming side. If the multihoming side can bypass the charge,
the strategy fails, even though the platform may be operating in an
intensely competitive platform market. Maintaining exclusive access to
one group of customers is not by itself exclusionary conduct under § 2.
IV. INTERMEDIARIES & PRIVATE ANTITRUST STANDING
The right to obtain damages for an antitrust violation depends
initially on the violation’s economic effects. As explained above, any
successful plaintiff must prove injury in fact, antitrust injury, causation,
antitrust standing, and non-speculative damages. An aspect of antitrust
standing is that the plaintiff must be a direct purchaser. These are
fundamentally economic conditions. Before assessing private standing in
cases brought against platforms, consideration of the economics of cases
brought against intermediaries in one-sided markets is helpful.
A. Economic Effects in One-Sided Markets
The Apple Court suggested that when an intermediary exercises both
monopoly and monopsony power, consumers and suppliers are injured
and are entitled to recover damages, and their recoveries do not
overlap.229 Suppose a firm purchases a product from suppliers and resells
it to consumers. The firm would function as a distributor in a typical onesided market, such as a grocery store buying lettuce from farmers and
selling it to consumers.230 The difference between the price the firm paid

228. See Filistrucchi et al., supra note 227, at 301.
229. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1525 (2019).
230. See Rysman, supra note 201, at 126. Rysman argues that the distinguishing feature of
a one-sided market is that the supplier is not paid by the intermediary based on the success of
the intermediary with buyers. The supplier collects that wholesale price and is then indifferent
to the success of the intermediary in selling the good. Rysman notes, however, that a grocery
store can be modelled as a two-sided market. See Rysman, supra note 201, at 126 n.1
(referring to Armstrong, supra note 213, at 684–86). In Armstrong’s model, suppliers
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for the product and the retail price it charges is the markup, and to the
suppliers it represents their cost of distribution. If the intermediary
functions in a perfectly competitive market, the markup will equal the
marginal cost of distribution, for competition forces the intermediary to
charge a price for its services equal to marginal cost. If the supplier also
functions in a perfectly competitive market, the wholesale price it charges
the distributor will equal its marginal cost of production, and consumers
would pay the competitive price. Economic welfare is maximized.
Now suppose that the grocery store is the only one in town. It has
monopoly power but no monopsony power, for lettuce growers can sell
to stores throughout the country. The store charges a monopoly price for
lettuce, implying a higher markup and thus a higher cost of distribution
for growers, who sell less lettuce to the store. Consumers are injured—
they pay more and collectively buy less lettuce because of the grocer’s
exercise of monopoly power. If the store acquired its monopoly power
illegally, the consumers who bought lettuce incur an antitrust injury, and
they have antitrust standing. Their damages are the difference between
the price they paid and the price they would have paid absent the exercise
of monopoly power, multiplied by the quantity purchased. If these
consumers would have bought more lettuce at the lower, competitive
price, they suffer additional injury, and consumers who did not buy
lettuce but would have bought it at the lower price also suffer antitrust
injury. Because proof of the counterfactual is infeasible, however, buyers
are generally not allowed to recover damages for purchases not made.231
Growers may also be injured, but not by much. They sell to the store at
the same price and make the same profit on the lettuce sold, but they sell
less lettuce.232 In a competitive wholesale lettuce market, the difference

multihome and consumers single-home over the relevant period. See Armstrong, supra note
213, at 684.
231. Purchases that were not made at the monopoly price but would have been made at the
competitive price represent the deadweight loss, or allocative loss, of monopoly pricing in
standard economic depictions of monopoly. These losses, which are harm to persons other
than the offender, are part of the optimal sanction for an antitrust violation. The trebling of
cognizable damages can be understood to represent in part the deadweight loss for which
buyers are unable to recover. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.
L. & ECON. 445, 454–55 (1985) (“The multiplier of 1.5 thus may be a rough approximation
of the lower bound [of the full allocative loss]. It takes care of the fact that the nonbuyers do
not recover damages”).
232. If the store competed in the purchase of lettuce with a small number of non-store
buyers, such as institutional users, the purchasers collectively might confront a positively
sloped supply curve. In that event, a reduction in the amount of lettuce bought by the store
would reduce the price the store paid for lettuce. See Tirza J. Angerhofer & Roger D. Blair,
Monopoly and Monopsony: Antitrust Standing, Injury, and Damages, 89 U. CINCINNATI L.
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in quantity is small. If the growers cannot sell the lettuce they would have
sold to a competitive store in town to buyers outside of town, they suffer
an injury in the form of lost profits, and it is antitrust injury, but they have
no antitrust standing.
The effects of monopoly pricing are depicted in Figure 1. In a
competitive market, sellers set price equal to marginal cost and sell the
quantity dictated by the demand curve.233 The lettuce sellers collectively
would sell quantity Q1 at price P1. The firms earn surplus, or revenue in
excess of costs, equal to area cP1b; consumers earn surplus, or value in
excess of payment, equal to P1ab; and economic welfare, which is the
sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus, equal to cab, is
maximized.

REV. 256 (2021). Even though their injury is greater than if price remained constant, the
injured growers as input suppliers, would still lack standing to recover damages.
233. For a single firm that functions in a perfectly competitive market, the demand curve
facing the firm would be horizontal at the competitive price and would coincide with the
firm’s marginal revenue curve. See Price and Revenue in a Perfectly Competitive Industry
and
Firm,
LUMEN
LEARNING,
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/sunymicroeconomics/chapter/price-and-revenue-in-a-perfectly-competitive-industry-and-aperfectly-competitive-firm/ (last visited May. 13, 2021).
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FIGURE 1: OUTPUT MARKET
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A monopolist sets quantity such that price is equal to marginal
revenue (which will lie below the demand curve if the seller faces a
negatively sloped demand curve). The monopoly grocer will sell Q2 units
of lettuce at price P2. The area P1P2fd represents monopoly profits, or a
wealth transfer from consumers to the seller. (Area cP1de represents
producer surplus that the seller would have earned in a competitive
market.) Consumer surplus is now area P2af; producer surplus is area
cP2fe; and economic welfare declines to area cafe. The loss of total
welfare, or the deadweight loss or allocative inefficiency, is area efb.
Lettuce consumers are entitled to damages equal to (P2-P1) x Q2. Lettuce
growers sell less lettuce to the grocer, measured by Q1-Q2 units, but
because the store has no monopsony power, those units represent a trivial
proportion of lettuce growers’ output and may be sold in other markets.
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Suppose the market for the retail sale of lettuce is competitive.
Figure 2 depicts the market for the wholesale purchase of lettuce, or the
input market. If the input market is competitive, grocers purchase the
quantity of lettuce determined by the intersection of supply (S) and the
value of the marginal product (VMP),234 or q1. Price is determined by the
supply curve and is p1. If a single grocer unlawfully acquired monopsony
power but had no monopoly power,235 the grocer would determine the
quantity purchased by equating the value of the marginal product and the
marginal outlay (MO). The grocer would buy q2 units and pay farmers
the price determined by the supply curve, which is p2 . Farmers would be
entitled to damages equal to (p1-p2) x q2. Total welfare declines from zxy
to zxuv. Deadweight loss equals vuy.

234. The value of the marginal product can be thought of as the demand function, though
technically a monopsonist does not have a demand function. See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY
L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 44 n.8 (2010).
235. See Angerhofer & Blair, supra note 232. An intermediary might have monopsony
power but not monopoly power. Cf. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber
Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (resolving predatory buying claim against lumber buyer that
allegedly had monopsony but not monopoly power). The monopsonist would buy less of the
input and at a lower price than the quantity and price that would prevail in a competitive
buying market. Input suppliers would suffer injury and have antitrust standing. Output
purchasers would incur an increase in price because the exercise of monopsony power would
raise the intermediary’s marginal cost of production. But output purchasers would not have
antitrust standing to recover damages. Their injury is indirect, just as the injury suppliers
suffer from an exercise of monopoly power is indirect.
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FIGURE 2: INPUT MARKET—NO MONOPOLY
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Imagine now that the grocery store acquires monopoly power after
acquiring monopsony power. It becomes the only store in town, and
lettuce is grown nearby by multiple farmers and cannot economically be
shipped out of the area. Figure 3 depicts the input market.

FIGURE 3: INPUT MARKET—WITH MONOPOLY
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The grocery now determines the quantity of lettuce to buy based not
on the intersection of the marginal outlay and supply curves but on the
intersection of the marginal outlay and the marginal revenue product
(MRP) curve, which lies below the VMP curve. Quantity is now q 3, and
price is p3. As shown in Figure 2, an exercise of monopsony power by
itself reduces the quantity of lettuce bought from and the price received
by growers relative to the quantity and price that would prevail in a
competitive wholesale purchasing market, and therefore the markup is
higher.
As for farmers, the exercise of monopoly power reduces the price
they would be paid if the monopsonist had no monopoly power, from p2
to p3, but they are not entitled to damages based on this price decline
because they lack standing for this loss; it is a loss incurred as a supplier
to an antitrust violator in an output market. 236 The practical effect of this
236. See generally Angerhofer & Blair supra note 232 and accompanying text.

1230

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 71:1183

condition is that damages are not based on the difference between the
price farmers were actually paid (p3) and the price they would have been
paid absent monopsony power (p1). It is based on the difference between
the price they would have been paid if the buyer had monopsony power
but no monopoly power (p2) and the price they would have been paid
absent monopsony power (p1). A damage calculation, which usually
compares an actual price to a hypothetical price, becomes a calculation
that compares two hypothetical prices, compounding the risk of error.
Moreover, as noted above, an exercise of monopoly power alone
reduces the amount of lettuce bought from suppliers but not the price paid
for it if the buyer lacks monopsony power. An exercise of monopsony
power by a monopolist reduces the quantity of the product purchased
from suppliers below that which would prevail if the purchaser had
monopoly or monopsony power alone, and the purchaser will pay a lower
price as a result of the exercise of monopsony power. But because their
damages suffered from monopsony alone are based on the quantity
actually sold and that quantity declines as a result of the buyer’s
monopoly power, their damages for monopsony decline as a result of the
buyer’s monopoly power, from (p1-p2) x q2 to (p1-p2) x q3. Thus, their
damages are represented by area p2p1kl, not area p2p1rv, and they do not
recover for area p3p2lm, even though this area represents damages they
sustained.
Consumers are injured by the exercise of monopoly power but not
monopsony power. The exercise of both monopoly and monopsony
power, therefore, reduces economic welfare relative to competitive
conditions in both markets and relative to an exercise of either kind of
market power alone.
If monopoly and monopsony power are obtained unlawfully and
exercised, both consumers and suppliers suffer antitrust injury and have
antitrust standing, but not for all of their losses.237 When the Apple Court
237. If monopoly power and monopsony power are obtained unlawfully but nonsimultaneously, the price and welfare effects are invariant to the sequence in which they are
obtained. For example, the grocery store may obtain monopoly power by predating against
rival stores and monopsony power by predating against institutional buyers, and it may engage
in these actions at different time. The damages to which suppliers and consumers are entitled,
however, are affected by sequence. The analysis in the text presents the scenario in which
monopoly power is acquired after monopsony power. If the reverse sequence occurs, the
damages suppliers and consumers could recover would differ, but the differences need not be
explored here. If monopoly power and monopsony power are obtained unlawfully and
simultaneously, the price and welfare effects are identical to those under either pattern of
sequential collusion but isolating the damages of suppliers and consumers is difficult. Both
suppliers and output purchasers can demonstrate the difference between the actual price and
the but for price, but each set of plaintiffs are entitled only to a portion of the difference,
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noted that both app developers and iPhone owners might have standing
to pursue claims against Apple, it may have had this circumstance in
mind. The plaintiffs are iPhone users, and they suffer cognizable damages
by an exercise of monopoly power. App developers could also recover if
they could prove that Apple unlawfully acquired monopsony power. The
damages each group could recover are not duplicative in theory and
therefore do not require apportioning a common fund. In practice,
determining the damages each group suffered could be difficult, but this
is not a conceptual weakness. Illinois Brick would not bar suits by either
group. Even if the facts of Apple do not fit this model, the model
potentially applies to other real-world circumstances.
B. Economic Effects in More Complicated Markets
Apple, in fact, does differ from the analysis above and the example
used to explain it in several ways. First, the markets just explored are onesided markets, whereas Apple functions in a two-sided market. Second,
lettuce is fungible, whereas mobile phone apps are differentiated
products. Third, lettuce distribution entails marginal costs, whereas the
marginal cost of mobile phone app distribution may be zero or close to it.
And fourth, Apple did not impose a markup on app developers, but an ad
valorem fee, or commission set at a percentage of revenue received. The
question is whether any of these differences alone or in combination
change the analysis.
That a firm operates in a two-sided market does not necessarily
undermine the analysis or conclusions. A defining characteristic of twosided markets is that a platform in setting prices must take into account
the effect of a price charged to one group of customers not only on the
demand of that group but also on the demand of the other group. Further,
the platform’s prices may or may not be affected by competition from
other platforms or from entities competing only on one or the other side
of the platform’s market. The possession of monopoly power on either
side of a market will affect the platform’s price level but generally not its
pricing structure.238
Apple, however, operates in a particular kind of two-sided market,
a two-sided transaction market. The relevant condition for economic
analysis is that a firm has the economic ability and legal right to impose

because some of the difference is attributable to the exercise of economic power in the other
market for which they cannot recover. See generally Angerhofer & Blair, supra note 232.
238. See Evans, supra note 204, at 355; see also Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 1009;
see also Richard Schmalensee, Payment Systems and Interchange Fees, 50 J. INDUS. ECON.
103, 118 (2002).
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a fee on a transaction between two other parties. That condition by
definition holds for transaction platforms, but it also holds in
circumstances that are not conventionally described as two-sided
markets, such as a firm with intellectual property rights that other firms
use in executing transactions. A fee imposed nominally on one side will
be anticipated by the other side, leading in many circumstances to a loss
for both sides in much the same way that such an overcharge would injure
suppliers and consumers when the intermediary functions in two onesided markets.
The other features of Apple’s economic ecosystem are also
analytically significant. The definition of a differentiated product is that
it has no perfect substitutes in consumption, which means that the
producer faces a negatively sloped demand curve for its product. This
does not mean that the product has monopoly power in a sense relevant
to antitrust law; it may compete with imperfect substitutes in what would
constitute an antitrust market. Nevertheless, the producer of a
differentiated product recognizes that it can vary the quantity demanded
by changing price. To repeat, in a two-sided market, price changes on one
side of the market affect demand on the other side of the market, but this
condition does not alter the fact that price changes on one side of a market
do affect quantity on that side. Further, the distribution of mobile phone
apps, because it takes place through the internet, has low marginal costs,
perhaps approaching zero, whoever performs the distribution function.
Indeed, as intellectual property, apps are subject to pronounced
economies of scale on the supply side. The fixed costs of development
are substantial, but the variable costs of production are low, and
production is scalable.239 Finally, as shown below, when a distributor
charges an ad valorem fee for its services rather than a per-unit fee, the
economic effects are dramatically different.240 These effects depend on
the size of the marginal costs of distribution.
When a platform imposes a per-unit fee on consumers and suppliers
of the product desired by consumers sell differentiated products at prices
they determine, each supplier will anticipate the fee in setting its price. If
the fee is supra-competitive, because the distributor has monopoly power,
the fee will result in higher prices paid and lower quantities purchased by
consumers than the prices and quantities that would have prevailed at

239. See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS, & MICROSOFT 82
(1999) (noting that in the production technology of software, “it is possible for the firm to
alter its scale extremely rapidly,” and observing that “[t]his instant scalability means that
firms can acquire the means to expand production with little or no lag”).
240. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 40, at 262.
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competitive service fees. In these circumstances, suppliers and
consumers are injured.
Begin with the assumption that marginal costs of distribution are
zero. Figure 4 depicts the market for an app where the platform imposes
a per-unit fee. For simplicity, assume that the entire fee is a monopoly
tax, though the “tax” in this context means not a charge levied by
government but the charge any owner of a facility can impose for use of
the facility.
FIGURE 4: PER-UNIT FEE AND ZERO MARGINAL COSTS
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From the perspective of the app developer, D represents the demand
for the app. The demand curve can usefully be thought of in this context
as the average revenue curve. Absent a platform tax and assuming the
developer would set a single price, the developer would set quantity
where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost, which is zero. The
developer would sell Q1 units at price P1. The developer’s revenue would
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equal area 0P1cQ1, and consumers would earn surplus of P1ac. The perunit fee reduces the average revenue by the amount of the fee, and it is
constant, resulting in derived demand curve d. The developer would
calculate a derived marginal revenue curve (mr) and set quantity where
mr equals zero. The developer would sell Q2 units at price P2 because
price is determined by the demand curve, not the average revenue curve
that incorporates the tax. A deadweight loss results, equal to area ebc.
Total revenue is the area 0P2bQ2, which is divided between the platform
and the developer. The platform takes area P3P2bf; the developer earns
0P3fQ2. Consumers suffer damages equal to P1P2be, given that they can
recover for the overcharge but not for the deadweight loss. The developer
suffers a loss equal to the difference between P1cQ10 and P3fQ20, which
is represented by area P3P1cQ1Q2fP3. When damages are measured by the
overcharge rather than lost profits, the developer’s damages are P3P1ef.
Critically, the damages suffered by consumers do not overlap with the
damages suffered by the developer.
When marginal costs are positive, the magnitudes of losses change,
but the important implications do not. In Figure 5, the platform imposes
a per-unit charge that is entirely a monopoly tax, but marginal costs are
significantly positive.
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FIGURE 5: PER-UNIT FEE AND POSITIVE MARGINAL COSTS
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Price increases from P1 to P2. Consumer surplus shrinks from P1ac
to P2ab, reflecting a deadweight loss of ebc. The fee reduces total welfare.
Consumers can recover damages equal to the difference between P 1 and
P2 multiplied by Q2 units. The developer suffers loss equal to the
difference between area jP1ch and jP3fi; the developer’s overcharge
damages are represented by area jP3fi. Again, the damages of consumers
and the developer do not overlap.
When the platform charges an ad valorem fee and marginal costs are
zero, the effects are markedly different from the effects of a per-unit fee,
whether marginal costs are zero or positive. Figure 6 (displayed below on
page eighty-eight) depicts the case.
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FIGURE 6: AD VALOREM FEE WITH ZERO MARGINAL COSTS
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The essential difference between an ad valorem charge and a perunit charge is that the former is a percentage of the sales price, and at the
limit it is zero. In Figure 6, absent any charge, the developer sets quantity
where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal cost (0). Price is P1, and
quantity is Q1. The ad valorem charge results in a derived demand curve
(d), which coincides with the demand curve at a price of zero. As price
increases, the difference between the derived demand curve (or derived
average revenue curve) and the demand curve (or average revenue curve)
increases. The developer sets quantity where derived marginal revenue
equals marginal cost, or Q1, and price, which is determined by quantity,
is P1. The price and quantity are identical to the price and quantity that
would prevail if no charge were imposed. Consumers, therefore, suffer
no static injury, and the tax creates no deadweight loss. The revenue of
the developer, however, drops from area 0P1cQ1 to area 0P3fQ1. The total
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profits remain the same, but those profits are now split between the
developer and the platform, with the platform receiving revenue equal to
area P3P1cf. The developer and only the developer suffers an antitrust
injury, and only the developer can recover damages.
If marginal costs are substantially positive, however, both the
developer and consumers are injured. 241 Figure 7 presents the situation.
FIGURE 7: AD VALOREM FEE WITH POSITIVE MARGINAL COSTS
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The analysis is similar to the analysis when marginal costs are zero.
Absent an ad valorem fee, the developer would equate marginal revenue
(MR) and marginal cost (MC), which is now positive, and would sell Q 1
241. A price above marginal cost to any extent will theoretically reduce quantity sold. But
small increments above marginal cost will have small effects on quantity, and hence on the
harm suffered by consumers. The costs of recognizing an action by consumers and calculating
damages in these circumstances are likely to outweigh the benefits of more precise
compensation and more accurate deterrence.
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units at price P1. Profits would equal area P4P1cf. With an ad valorem fee,
the developer sets quantity at the intersection of derived marginal revenue
(mr) and marginal cost (MC). Quantity drops to Q2 and price increases to
P2. Total profits decline to area P4P2bh, and total welfare declines by area
ebc. Profits are divided between the developer and the platform, with the
developer now earning area P4P3gh, and the platform receiving area
P3P2bg. The developer’s damages are (P1-P3) x Q2. Consumers are
injured: the fee results in a higher price and lower quantity. Consumers’
damages are (P2-P1) x Q2. The critical point is that when a monopoly ad
valorem fee is imposed and marginal costs are significantly positive, both
developers and consumers suffer cognizable harm, and their damages are
not duplicative.
V. ANTITRUST STANDING, AD VALOREM CHARGES, & APPLE
The application to Apple and similar cases of the analysis set out
above is straightforward. When an intermediary unlawfully exercises
monopoly power through imposition of an ad valorem fee, static
efficiency and private antitrust standing depend on the existence and level
of the marginal costs of production and distribution. Where suppliers sell
differentiated products, the marginal cost of production and distribution
is zero, and the distributor imposes a supra-competitive ad valorem fee
on transactions, the distributor’s exercise of monopoly power will not
reduce static efficiency or cause consumers who purchase the products to
incur a short-run loss. Consumers will pay no higher a price for the
products they buy or purchase less. Because the economic rewards
suppliers reap from their efforts decline, however, the platform’s supracompetitive fee may reduce the incentive to invest in development and
thereby cause a long-run reduction in the availability of products.242
Consumers will ultimately feel the pinch of this dynamic inefficiency, for
they will not be able to buy products that are never produced. But this
kind of loss, which is inherently difficult to measure, is generally not
recognized as a compensable injury.243 Because consumers suffer no
cognizable injury in fact, they cannot recover antitrust damages.
Suppliers who sell products are injured. They sell the same quantity
of products, but because of the antitrust violation their return is less by
the amount of the marginal supra-competitive commission.244 In Apple,
242. See Kobayashi & Wright, supra note 40, at 267.
243. Id.
244. Cf. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154231, *2–5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2020) (granting in part and denying in part temporary
restraining order preventing platform from taking action against app developer for enabling
in-app payment processing in violation of licensing and developer-tool agreements); Cecilia
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the plaintiffs alleged that the entire commission was supra-competitive.
The allegation is implausible, because Apple certainly incurred some
costs in providing services both developers and iPhone owners valued.
Still, developers suffered an injury-in-fact defined by the portion of the
ad valorem fee attributable to anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, their
injury is antitrust injury because it is the type of injury “the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and . . . flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful,”245 even though the distributor’s acts cause no
short-run inefficiency. These suppliers would also have antitrust
standing. They are the only efficient private enforcers of the antitrust
laws, for the best alternative private enforcers—consumers—have no
right to sue for damages. Moreover, their measure of damages is clear:
the proportion of revenue taken by the intermediary from the sale of the
suppliers’ products, and calculation of their damages is relatively simple.
Recognizing that suppliers in these circumstances incur antitrust
injury, have antitrust standing, and are entitled to damages equal to their
lost revenue is also consistent with the economic principle of the optimal
penalty. They are persons other than the offender who suffer harm. When
conduct causes an allocative inefficiency, the optimal penalty consists of
the deadweight loss plus the wealth transfer from buyers to the offender.
In the circumstances presented here, the conduct causes no deadweight
loss, but it does cause a wealth transfer, and the sum of zero plus the
wealth transfer is the wealth transfer. As a general matter, the optimal
penalty does not equal the gain to the offender because such a standard
would eliminate the offender’s incentive to engage in efficient
violations—those in which a reduction in marginal cost brought about by
the unlawful conduct exceeds the deadweight loss.246 A penalty that does
not deter such conduct entails lower administrative costs than defining
liability rules that exclude the conduct, and it does deter inefficient
violations. But in the circumstances here, the offender’s marginal costs
absent the violation are zero. The conduct does not lower marginal cost,
and therefore the penalty, which here does equal the offender’s gain, does
not threaten to deter efficient conduct.

D’Anastasio, Epic Games’ Lawsuits Fire a Shot at Apple and Google’s App Store
‘Monopolies’, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/epic-games-sues-applefortnite-app-store/ (reporting monopolization complaint filed by app developer against Apple
for equitable relief). Producers who are deterred from entering the market and those who are
deterred from expanding their product offerings would also suffer antitrust injury, but like
consumers who are denied the products that would have been produced, they would not suffer
cognizable harm from these losses.
245. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
246. See Landes, supra note 78, at 655.

1240

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 71:1183

Because suppliers and not consumers are injured, Illinois Brick has
nothing to say about whether both groups can recover damages. Suppliers
do not pass on an overcharge to consumers. The groups are not staking
claims to a common fund. Damages are not particularly difficult to
calculate, but even if they were, the complexity would be no different
than that attendant to damage calculation in any antitrust case.
The rules of private antitrust standing produce different results when
the marginal costs of production and distribution are significantly
positive. In this case, the intermediary’s imposition of an ad valorem fee
injures both suppliers and consumers. Damages for each group are
conceptually distinct; they are not duplicative. Moreover, they can be
calculated, albeit with more difficulty than where marginal cost is
roughly zero. The proper calculation of damages depends upon the
amounts both suppliers and consumers would pay absent the supracompetitive charge. But just what the charges would be in the but-for
world is not clear. In Apple, for example, if Apple could not lawfully
charge a thirty percent commission, it might charge a zero-transaction fee
but increase the access fee charged developers. It might instead charge a
per unit fee, or it might charge a lower ad valorem fee. The economics of
two-sided markets teaches that price-setting must take into account
feedback effects. What is clear is that if Apple incurs positive marginal
costs of distributing apps, the commission it now charges cannot be the
measure of damages. This recognition, in turn, has implications for the
propriety of litigating claims through class actions. The competitive
baseline for calculating damages differs among apps, as different apps
have different elasticities of demand. If the but-for price has to be
calculated for each app, individual issues would likely predominate over
class-wide issues, precluding collective litigation.
What this means is that Illinois Brick does not stand as a bar to
actions by suppliers and consumers. Recall that the indirect-purchaser
cases rest upon three principles: (1) private parties must be allowed to
recover the entire supra-competitive payment; (2) private parties may not
recover more than the entire amount; and (3) antitrust standing rules
should accomplish the objective of optimal recovery as efficiently as
possible.247 The first two principles speak to the optimal penalty. Putting
aside the possibility of public enforcement, 248 if private parties are

247. See supra Part II B.
248. The calculation of the optimal penalty should include both civil and criminal remedies.
The expected deterrent is the sum of the expected criminal penalty and expected damages
liability. See RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 47 (2019) (“Criminal and civil remedies for
antitrust violations are usually considered and evaluated separately, but this is a mistake”).
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prevented from recovering collectively the net harm to others caused by
an antitrust violation, adjusted for probability, anticompetitive conduct
will be under-deterred. If private parties are allowed to recover more than
the net harm to others, anticompetitive conduct will be over-deterred,
resulting in socially costly measures to avoid liability.
Allowing distributors and consumers to recover their respective
losses satisfies these conditions. Indeed, barring either suppliers or
consumers from recovering and allowing only one group or the other to
recover their damages would result in under-deterrence as well as undercompensation. The Court in Illinois Brick was concerned about the risk
of excessive, or multiple, liability, which would result in over-deterrence.
But the principal source of this risk was an asymmetric pass-on rule in
which indirect purchasers would be allowed to recover but sellers would
not be able to assert pass-on as a defense in an action by direct
purchasers.249 Such a set of pass-on rules would all but guarantee multiple
liability because indirect purchasers would always recover the same
damages that direct purchasers recover. Allowing both suppliers and
customers to recover when a distributor has positive marginal costs and
charges a supra-competitive ad valorem fee does not pose the same risk
of multiple liability. Excessive recovery would only occur if courts
misestimate damages for one or both groups in a way that overstates total
harm, a possibility that itself depends as a practical matter on the groups
of plaintiffs suing in separate actions. This is a risk, but it is a risk of a
different kind and of a different order of magnitude than the one that most
concerned the Illinois Brick Court.
The third consideration is more troublesome. Damage calculations
may well be challenging, which implies significant litigation costs. As
noted above, errors in calculations could result in excessive liability, but
it could also result in inadequate liability. There is little reason to expect
that calculations will be biased one way or the other. The expected cost
of error could not justify foreclosing one group or the other from
recovering for their injuries where optimal deterrence recognizes that the
offender must be held liable for total losses.
An alternative to allowing both groups to recover, however, is to
allow one group to recover both for their own losses and the other group’s
losses. How that alternative could be effectuated under current law is
opaque. Notice that allowing both groups to recover does not pose the

The possibility of public remedies here is ignored principally for expositional simplicity, but
criminal penalties are not imposed for monopolization in any event.
249. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730 (1977) (“[A]llowing offensive but
not defensive use of pass-on would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants”).
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standard pass-on problem. In the typical indirect-purchaser context, the
initial overcharge is relatively easy to calculate. The direct purchaser is
allowed to recover damages based on this amount even when economic
theory indicates that the entity passed on some of that overcharge to its
customer. Optimal deterrence is assured. The calculations are different
when a distributor imposes an ad valorem fee on transactions or, indeed,
when an intermediary imposes any kind of fee on transactions, such as
the fixed fees imposed by Ticketmaster in Campos.250 The fee in
whatever form has a necessary and predictable impact on both parties to
the transaction. In conventional overcharge cases, the overcharge will not
necessarily be passed on to anyone. An animating concern in Illinois
Brick was that multiple levels of indirect purchasers might exist. A rule
that allowed indirect purchasers to recover would therefore invite suit by
multiple groups of plaintiffs, thus increasing litigation costs with the
increase in parties and the need to apportion the single overcharge across
multiple groups of purchasers. When an intermediary incurs positive
marginal costs of distribution and imposes a charge on a transaction
between members of two groups, two groups are necessarily injured, for
a transaction always involves two parties, and only two groups of
plaintiffs would have standing under conventional standing doctrines.
Litigation costs are thus cabined.
No other requirement of private antitrust standing would thwart the
claims of suppliers and consumers. The injuries are caused by the
antitrust violation. Both groups suffer injury in fact, and their injuries are
antitrust injuries. Allowing both groups to recover would not conflict
with any other consideration embodied in the rules of antitrust standing
apart from the indirect-purchaser rules.
Because consumers’ right to recover when the distributor charges an
ad valorem fee depends on whether the supplier’s marginal costs of
production and distribution are significantly positive, the marginal costs
of app developers in Apple are worth considering. A fair surmise is that
the marginal costs of producing apps is at least close to zero. Apps
fundamentally are intellectual property. They are not embodied in a
physical medium, such as a compact disk. Whatever server capacity is
necessary to store them is not likely to vary with output, at least for most
apps. The marginal costs of distribution, however, are almost certainly
positive. The App Store lowers consumer search costs, in part by
gathering multiple apps in a single location and in part by assuring that

250. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
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apps meet the level of quality and utility set by Apple.251 Absent the App
Store, developers would incur the costs of performing these functions, or
more likely, would not be able to perform these functions at all. Some
market evidence of the value of the App Store is provided by the
distribution of apps for Android smartphones. Google owns Android and
aggregates apps for Android phones on its Play Store. Google charges
app developers a thirty percent commission on apps downloaded by
consumers from the Google Play Store, the same commission Apple
charges for iPhone apps.252 But unlike Apple, Google does not limit
distribution to downloads from its store. If Android app developers did
not derive value from distributing apps through Google Play, one would
expect them to distribute solely outside of that channel, thereby avoiding
the thirty percent commission. Their willingness to pay the commission
implies that the marginal costs of distribution for at least some developers
is significantly positive.
That marginal distribution costs are positive does not mean that
Apple’s thirty percent commission reflects its marginal costs of
distributing apps and the marginal costs that developers avoid. Rather,
Apple’s commission likely reflects Apple’s attempt to set prices to both
sides of its two-sided market in a way that maximizes demand for its
platform and attendant profits. If Apple charges iPhone users a low price
to expand the size of that group, recognizing that smartphone owners
typically single-home, so that it can charge developers a relatively high
price, it cannot allow developers to avoid the charge by selling to iPhone
users outside of the App Store. The upshot, then, is that Apple’s thirty
percent commission may or may not be supra-competitive, but it almost
certainly reflects positive marginal costs in providing a distribution
function.

251. Videogame consoles provide a useful comparison. Consoles are platforms, and
console manufacturers charge videogame developers royalties based on sales of games to
consumers. These royalties amount to ad valorem fees imposed per transaction on developers.
See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 1012. Arguably, developers have low but positive
marginal costs of distribution, and console manufacturers incur no such marginal costs. They
do not aggregate video games, and they do not even process transactions, which take place
solely between developers and consumers. Console manufacturers need not funnel
transactions through a marketplace to impose transaction fees because they are able to enforce
their intellectual property rights without such a mechanism.
252. See Priya Viwanathan, iOS App Store v. Google Play Store, LIFEWIRE (Mar. 9, 2020),
https://www.lifewire.com/ios-app-store-vs-google-play-store-for-app-developers-2373130.
More Android apps available in Google Play are free than are iOS apps available in the App
Store, and Google’s access fee, which is twenty-five dollars, is less than Apple’s access fee
of ninety-nine dollars. See id.
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The plaintiffs in Apple, however, who are iPhone owners, alleged
that Apple’s thirty percent commission is “‘pure profit.’” 253 The
implication is that Apple’s marginal cost of distributing apps is zero. The
plaintiffs come perilously close to pleading themselves out of court.
Given that the marginal costs of production are probably close to zero, if
the marginal costs of distribution are also zero, the ad valorem charge
would cause iPhone owners no cognizable injury. But as the analysis
above indicates, the implicit allegation that Apple’s marginal costs of
distribution is zero is implausible, and even if it were, the app developers
could theoretically incur positive costs of distribution whereas the
platform’s marginal costs of distribution are zero. The plausible
allegation is that Apple’s marginal cost of distribution is positive though
less than thirty percent, and the plaintiffs would suffer a cognizable loss
caused, as a first approximation, by the supra-competitive portion of the
charge. Dismissing the complaint for an implausible allegation would
accomplish little when the plausible allegation would defeat dismissal.
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
A. The Apple Dissent
The dissenters resolved Apple primarily on the ground of proximate
cause. They argued that Illinois Brick allows only buyers proximately
injured by an antitrust violation to recover damages, and only app
developers were proximately injured by Apple’s alleged
monopolization.254 The dissent described the “rules of proximate
causation” as “ancient” and suggested that their application in Apple was
straightforward.255 But “proximate cause” is an opaque term, and it is too
blunt an instrument to separate antitrust claimants entitled to recover from
other victims. As the Restatement Third observes, “There may be no legal
term in as widespread usage as proximate cause that has been as
excoriated as it has. One searches in vain to find a defender of the term;
its critics are legion . . . .”256
253. Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1519 (2019)
254. See id. at 1526–27 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The dissent used the term “proximate
cause” or a cognate eighteen times.
255. Id. at 1526.
256. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §
29, cmt. a, Reporter’s Note (Am. L. Inst. 2005); see DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 198 (2d ed. June 2019 update) (noting that the “well-worn term [proximate cause] has been
justly criticized for years as inaccurate, misleading, and confusing, and has been rejected by
the Third Restatement of Torts, as it was in the Second”) (footnote omitted); see also Jane
Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54
VAND. L. REV. 941, 945 (2001) (calling “proximate cause” an “obfuscating” term); Richard
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Even though the term is unfortunate, it does denote, albeit
awkwardly, a fundamental concept that is uncontroversial. In tort law
generally, an actor is not liable for all harms factually caused by his or
her tort, recognizing that factual cause usually means a necessary, or “but
for,” condition.257 The scope of the actor’s liability is limited. Harms that
are in a relevant sense too remote from tortious conduct are not within
the tortfeasor’s scope of liability. For antitrust violations, which are
statutory torts,258 the principle means that an offender is not liable in
damages for all harms factually caused by his or her violation.259 This
unexceptional principle, however, does not lead to the dissenters’
conclusion. It establishes a negative rather than a positive. It recognizes
that an antitrust violator in not liable for all harms factually caused, but it
does not establish the set of harms for which the violator is liable. In
Lexmark, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he proximate-cause inquiry is
not easy to define.”260 It then instructed that in the context of a statutory

W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of
Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1074 (2001) (noting that the phrase proximate
cause is inadequate for its intended purpose of referring to “the extent of legal responsibility
for tortuously caused consequences”).
257. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 51, § 26. A sufficient but not
necessary condition can also be a factual cause. See id. § 27. Further, tortious conduct that is
neither necessary nor by itself sufficient to result in an injury can be a factual cause when the
conduct combined with the conduct of other actors overdetermines the harm. See id. § 27 cmt.
f.
258. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 588, 592 (7th
Cir. 1998) (Posner, C.J.) (“A private suit under the antitrust laws is a suit seeking relief against
a statutory tort . . . “); see also Delong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 840
F.2d 843, 848 (11th Cir. 1988) (observing that antitrust claims “sound in tort rather than
contract”); Myers v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 723 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that an
antitrust claim is “in essence a form of tort alleging business injury”); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill.
Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (referring to “the novel
statutory tort created by the federal antitrust laws”); Wilson P. Abraham Const. Corp. v. Texas
Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 900 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d sub nom., Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981) (observing that “[t]he case law has uniformly
characterized a private antitrust suit as a tort action”); Ohio Learning Ctrs., LLC v. Sylvan
Learning, Inc., No. Civ. RDB-10-1932, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102784, at *24 (D. Md. July
24, 2012) (referring to antitrust as “statutory tort” claim); King v. Town of Palisade, No.
16CV04, 2016 Colo. Dist. LEXIS 2006, at *23–24 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 10, 2016)
(“Generally, a private antitrust claim sounds in tort”).
259. See Grip-Pak, 694 F.2d at 473 (noting that antitrust law incorporates “the age-old tort
principle of remoteness of damage,” meaning that not every firm linked to the target of
anticompetitive conduct “by the forces of demand and supply is entitled to sue for damages
caused, indirectly, by that conduct”).
260. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 133 (2014).
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tort, the question it presents “is whether the harm alleged has a
sufficiently close connection to the conduct the statute prohibits.”261
Nothing in the concept of proximate cause implies that an offender
can be liable for only one injury. An injury can have more than one
proximate cause,262 and a wrongful act can proximately cause more than
one loss. A negligent driver may kill a child in a crosswalk and
emotionally traumatize her mother watching from nearby;263 the driver
proximately causes the death and the emotional distress.264 Lexmark itself
is a worthwhile example of the limits and expanse of proximate cause.
There, an original equipment manufacturer of toner cartridges sold a line,
called “Prebate” cartridges, at a discount.265 These cartridges contained a
microchip designed to prevent them from being refurbished by third
parties.266 Lexmark allegedly misrepresented to consumers that they were
legally bound by terms of sale requiring them to return the cartridges to
it.267 It also falsely advised remanufacturers that that they could not
lawfully refurbish these cartridges and that use of a third party’s
microchips, which they needed for refurbishing, was also unlawful.268
The replacement microchip manufacturer alleged that the false
representations violated the Lanham Act. 269 No one doubted that the
injuries suffered by the remanufacturers, who competed directly with
Lexmark, fell within the zone of interests protected by the statute, and
were proximately caused by the alleged violation. Critically, the Court
held that the replacement microchip manufacturer’s injuries also fell
within the zone of interests and were caused by the offense.270 The false
advertising proximately caused injuries to two sets of economic actors
performing different but related functions.
The scope of liability is limited, of course. The Court opined that if
the defendant’s offense forced a competitor out of business, “the
261. Id. The Court continued, “[p]ut differently, the proximate-cause requirement generally
bars suits for alleged harm that is ‘too remote’ from the defendant’s unlawful conduct.”
262. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 256, § 198 (“[S]everal wrongdoers are frequently
proximate causes of harm.”) (footnote omitted).
263. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914–15 (Cal. 1968).
264. Antitrust violations are almost always based on intentional rather than negligent
conduct, and proximate cause is often discussed in relation to negligence-based torts. The
concept, however, is applicable to all torts that require proof of damages. See, e.g., DOBBS
supra note 256, § 198 n.6 (“[S]cope of liability limitations are fundamental and can apply in
any kind of case in which damages must be proven, not merely in negligence cases”).
265. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 121.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 123.
269. See id. at 122.
270. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 137.
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competitor’s landlord, its electric company, and other commercial parties
who suffer merely as a result of the competitor’s ‘inability to meet [its]
financial obligations’” would not be able to recover.271 The Court
suggested that the incognizable harms are “purely derivative” of the harm
inflicted on the competitor, but the “purely derivative” label is no more
precise than the term “proximate cause.”272 For example, the emotional
distress suffered by the bystander derives solely from the death suffered
by the child, and yet both mother and child can sue. 273
In short, the fact that a distributor proximately causes an injury to
suppliers through an antitrust violation does not mean that it does not
proximately cause an injury to consumers. Determining the scope of
antitrust damages liability requires a more discerning analysis of the
interests served by a legal limitation on liability than is provided by an
incantation of “proximate cause.”
In tort law, the scope of an actor’s liability depends on the
probability and extent of a particular kind of harm, the cost to the actor
of avoiding it, and policy considerations.274 From an economic
perspective, the primary policy concern is the administrative costs of
recognizing liability relative to the costs of the next best alternative,
271. Id. at 134. (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, (2006)).
272. See id. at 133.
273. Tort law has not used or applied the term “derivative” consistently. One can
distinguish between a derivative injury and a derivative cause of action. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 6 cmt. a-c (Am. L. Inst. 2000) (distinguishing
between derivative “claims” and derivative injuries). The chief implication of declaring one
cause of action derivative of another is that the derivative action plaintiff takes only the rights
possessed by the principal cause of action plaintiff, so that defenses, such as contributory or
comparative negligence, available in the principal cause of action are available in the
derivative cause of action. If an injury is derivative, in that it is contingent upon injury to some
other person, but the cause of action is deemed independent, defenses against one injured
party are not imputed to the other. See Jo-Anne M. Baio, Note, Loss of Consortium: A
Derivative Injury Giving Rise to a Separate Cause of Action, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1344,
1354–56 (1982) (describing judicial tendency to treat loss of consortium actions as derivative,
thus requiring imputation of one spouse’s contributory negligence to the other spouse, and
arguing that loss of consortium is a derivative injury but an independent action). In bystander
emotional distress cases, courts typically treat both the bystander’s injury and cause of action
as derivative. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS, supra note 51, § 6 cmt. f, Reporter’s Note
on cmt. f.
274. See, e.g., BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 4:7
(2d ed. June 2019 update) (noting that “‘proximate cause’ or ‘legal cause’ may serve to limit
responsibility for legal or policy reasons for negligent conduct”) (footnote omitted). Tort law
also uses duty rules to limit liability (see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 51, §
29 cmt. f), and these rules are also shaped by policy considerations (id. § 7 cmt. a). Scope of
liability, or proximate cause, determinations are made by the finder of fact based on factors
specific to an individual case; duty rules are developed by courts based on factors applicable
to categories or actors or patterns of conduct. Id.
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whether that is simply to refuse to recognize liability or to augment
recovery by others in lieu of recognition. 275 These considerations apply
equally to antitrust standing. In a typical indirect-purchaser context,
where a fixed overcharge is passed on to subsequent buyers, as the
plaintiff occupies a link on the distribution chain farther from the
offender, the probability that the plaintiff was actually injured as a result
of the offender’s overcharge decreases.276 Further, the estimation of
damages becomes more complicated, less accurate, and hence more
costly as effect becomes farther removed from culpable act, and
permitting claims by an expanding set of victims inevitably increases
administrative costs. Finally, the objective of optimal deterrence can be
served at lower administrative costs by allowing direct purchasers to
recover the entire overcharge regardless of the proportion they pass on.
In this context, the loss suffered by direct purchasers falls within the
offender’s scope of liability; the loss suffered by indirect purchasers does
not.
The justification for the indirect purchaser rule, which corresponds
to the justification for limitations on a tortfeasor’s scope of liability, does
not support an absolute limitation on an intermediary’s liability to
suppliers or consumers. As explained above, permitting both suppliers
and consumers to recover from an intermediary that unlawfully
monopolizes the intermediate market potentially results in liability that is
neither inadequate nor excessive in deterring anticompetitive conduct and
achieves this result at tolerable administrative costs.

275. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, supra note 51, § 29 cmt. e. For example, one
justification for allowing a tort victim to recover punitive damages is that they in part account
for the injuries suffered by victims whose injuries are incognizable, so that the damages
recovered by the plaintiff more closely approximate the actual damage inflicted. Punitive
damages to this extent conduce toward liability that forces the tortfeasor to internalize the full
cost of his or her tort.
276. The Court alluded to this rationale in Lexmark. It acknowledged that the replacement
microchip manufacturer’s injuries were not directly caused by the OEM’s misrepresentations
to consumers but included the intervening link of injury to the remanufacturers. See Lexmark,
572 U.S. at 139. A conclusion that the microchip manufacturer’s injury was proximately
caused by Lexmark’s consumer misrepresentations, therefore. superficially conflicted with
the “‘general tendency’ not to stretch proximate cause ‘beyond the first step.’” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
[T]he reason for that general tendency is that there ordinarily is a “discontinuity”
between the injury to the direct victim and the injury to the indirect victim, so that the
latter is not surely attributable to the former (and thus also to the defendant’s
conduct), but might instead have resulted from “any number of [other] reasons.”
Id. at 139–40 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court rejected this possibility
in the circumstances presented. Id. at 140.
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The dissent argues that Apple charges one commission, and actual
damages cannot exceed this amount.277 Therefore, an application of
Illinois Brick that allows both consumers and developers to recover
damages will necessarily require the supra-competitive commission to be
divided between the two groups, and because pass-on must be allowed as
a defense if Illinois Brick does not bar suit by consumers, Apple is at risk
of duplicative damages.278 To avoid that result, developers may need to
be joined in any suit by consumers, complicating litigation in just the way
Illinois Brick sought to avoid.279 But determining the damages incurred
by developers and consumers is not comparable to determining the
amount of an overcharge passed on to potentially multiple levels of
indirect purchasers. Only two groups of plaintiffs will have standing, and
calculation of each group’s damages is conceptually distinct. The supracompetitive commission is not divided between two sets of claimants;
each set recovers its distinct damages, and the sum of the two equals the
commission.
Hanover Shoe, which prohibited the pass-on defense, need not be
overruled in this context. It is inapplicable because the issue is not passon. The issue is rather the measure of the loss suffered by two groups
participating in a single transaction when the intermediary imposes an
anticompetitive ad valorem fee. In a subsequent action by developers,
Apple’s defense is not that the developers passed on part of the
commission to consumers. It is that developers suffered damage
measured by the difference between the revenue they received for the sale
of apps and the revenue they would have received absent a supracompetitive commission. To be sure, if consumers and developers are
permitted to sue separately, courts could reach inconsistent conclusions
in calculating damages, resulting in excessive liability. But errors are
possible whenever damages are calculated, and these errors can lead to
excessive liability. Simply because two groups are injured by the same
conduct does not change that risk or justify a rule that prevents one group
from recovering.
B. Apple’s Argument
In the Supreme Court, Apple argued that the relevant product or
service is distribution, not apps.280 It sells distribution services directly to
app developers. Therefore, iPhone owners are indirect purchasers, as the
277. See Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1530 n.3 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
278. See id. at 1529.
279. See id.
280. See Brief of Petitioner at 36, Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019) (No. 17204), 2018 WL 3870180 (U.S.) at *36.
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cost of distribution is embedded in the price of the app. Allowing iPhone
owners to recover damages from Apple exposes Apple to duplicative
damages,281 and separating the damages absorbed by the app developers
from any damages passed on to iPhone owners involves precisely the sort
of calculation deemed impermissible in Illinois Brick.282 If Apple
monopolized the distribution market, only app developers have standing
to recover damages.
Apple also argued that it functioned as the agent of app
developers.283 As such, the relevant transaction that occurs when an
iPhone owner acquires an app is between the app developer and the
iPhone owner even if it takes place through the agency of the App Store.
The ostensible seller is only an agent and not the actual seller for antitrust
purposes when the actual seller sets the price of the product exchanged.
As the Supreme Court explained, “Apple’s theory is that Illinois Brick
allows consumers to sue only the party who sets the retail price, whether
or not that party sells the good or service directly to the complaining
party.”284 Under this characterization, iPhone owners are direct
purchasers of apps from app developers. An implication is that iPhone
owners alone would be able to sue app developers for anticompetitive
overcharges in the price of apps, but of course they would have a cause
of action only if app developers committed antitrust violations. The
iPhone owners did not make such a claim.
Apple’s principal argument is too clever by half. Apple sells
platform services, which are consumed by both app developers and
iPhone owners. It functions as a demand coordinator. 285 Apple
acknowledges that it “does various things that benefit consumers directly,
for example hosting the App Store, maintaining account files, and
processing and fulfilling app purchasers.”286 But it argues that these
services are irrelevant because “the alleged anticompetitive activity is on
the other side of the platform, in connection with Apple’s role as a
provider of distribution services to iOS developers.”287 The implicit claim
that “hosting the App Store” 288 and “processing and fulfilling app
purchases” 289 do not directly benefit app developers as well as consumers

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

See id. at 30.
See id. at 24.
See id. at 43–44.
Apple Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514, 1521 (2019).
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 205, at 138.
Brief of Petitioner, supra note 280, at 36.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id.
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is unfounded. But more important, to isolate services provided to one side
of the platform ignores the nature of a platform. A platform provides an
amalgam of discrete but interrelated services that reduce transaction costs
for distinct groups of users. The value of the platform is in the
amalgamation. The relevant service is platform service. That a platform
might charge one side a high price and the other a low or even negative
price does not change the fact that the platform is selling its service to
both sides; indeed, for a transaction platform, no match occurs unless
both sides simultaneously transact. The relevant market is the platform
market, which might or might not be limited to the iOS platform.
Apple’s argument suggests that consumers could sue Apple for
overcharges in discrete services that directly benefit consumers, such as
“processing and fulfilling app purchases.”290 But that is economically
nonsensical, and the administrative costs of measuring such an
overcharge, even if conceptually possible, would make tracing an
overcharge through several distribution levels comparatively cheap.
Perhaps Apple was highlighting a pleading defect, arguing that the
plaintiffs alleged monopolization of distribution rather than platform
services. But the substance of the argument is unconvincing. Further, as
explained above, separating the damages suffered by app developers from
those suffered by iPhone owners when an unlawful platform monopolist
imposes a supra-competitive ad valorem charge on transactions,
assuming positive marginal costs of distribution, neither inherently risks
multiple liability nor involves the kind of pass-on calculations deemed
impermissible in Illinois Brick.
Apple’s argument that it is merely the agent of app developers is
likewise unavailing. As explained above, agency has been significant in
antitrust primarily in the context of resale price maintenance. 291 But it has
no significance as either a legal or economic doctrine in applying the rules
of antitrust standing to the circumstances under consideration. An
intermediary can impose an ad valorem charge on the purchaser of a good
or service based on a price set by the seller. For example, Airbnb, a
popular platform that matches housing owners with short-term renters,
earns most of its revenue in ad valorem fees imposed on renters based on
rents set by owners. 292 Residential real estate brokers can formally
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 159–166 and accompanying text. Notably, Apple cites United States
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), a vertical price-fixing case, as general support for its
argument that “sales agents” cannot be held liable when they “follow their principals’
instructions as to what price to charge.” See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 280, at 19.
292. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 205, at 18; see also What Are Airbnb Service
Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/what-is-the-airbnb-service-fee
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represent buyers and charge them a percentage of the house purchase
price set by sellers, even though the fee is typically paid by the seller,
who can anticipate the charge in establishing the sales price. It matters on
which side a platform imposes a charge. The incidence of the charge is
not invariant to the side of the transaction on which it is imposed, as it is
in one-sided markets.293 But a charge imposed on either side of the market
will have an impact on the other side, so long as marginal costs are
positive. The issue in Apple is whether iPhone owners have antitrust
standing when a platform allegedly monopolizes a market and imposes a
supra-competitive ad valorem fee on transactions. The resolution of that
issue does not depend on whether the price of the good exchanged is set
by app developers or whether Apple can be characterized as the agent of
developers.
CONCLUSION
Simple economics makes for straight-forward law. The economics
of intermediaries is not simple. When an intermediary functions in two,
one-sided markets, as a buyer in one and seller in the other, it might
unlawfully acquire and exercise monopsony power alone, monopoly
power alone, or both. The principles of private standing to recover
damages for antitrust violations permit input sellers to recover when the
intermediary exercises monopsony power, output customers to recover
when the intermediary exercises monopoly power, and both suppliers and
customers to recover when the intermediary exercises both kinds of
market power. The Illinois Brick rule, however, limits recovery to
immediate suppliers and customers.
When an intermediary functions as a platform in a two-sided market,
it can levy a charge on a transaction that uses the platform. If it has
unlawfully acquired economic power in a platform market, the charge
will be supra-competitive. When the charge takes the form of a per-unit
fee, both parties to the transaction suffer a cognizable injury. When it
takes the form of an ad valorem fee, its incidence depends on whether the
marginal costs of the service the platform provides are significantly
positive. If the platform’s marginal costs are close to zero, only suppliers
suffer a cognizable injury; if they are positive, both suppliers and
customers suffer cognizable injuries. Neither Illinois Brick nor any other
(last visited May. 13, 2021) (stating that standard fee structure for individual homes is 3% for
hosts and “typically under 14.2 percent of the booking subtotal,” which consists primarily of
the nightly rate).
293. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 207, at 996 (explaining that when “neutrality” holds,
meaning that a tax will have the same impact regardless of the party on whom it is imposed,
markets should be treated as one-sided).
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doctrine limiting the right to recover damages prevents both groups from
recovering when they are injured. When only suppliers are injured, only
suppliers can recover, but Illinois Brick is not the reason customers
cannot recover.
Apple involves a platform operating in a two-sided market. Apple
imposed an ad valorem charge on transactions occurring on the platform
and sought to prevent off-platform transactions. The Court treated Apple
as if it were an intermediary operating in two, one-sided markets. That
was a mistake. The dissent believed that Illinois Brick prevents iPhone
owners from recovering damages because only app developers were
proximately harmed. That, too, was a mistake. Apple argued that iPhone
owners could not recover because Apple was the agent of app developers.
And that was a mistake. If the marginal costs of app distribution are
positive, iPhone owners were injured, and Illinois Brick would not stand
in their way. If the marginal costs are near zero, they have no standing,
but Illinois Brick would not be the impediment.

